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Abstract
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Fortino undermined the U.S.
Supreme Court’s holding in Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano. In Sumitomo, the Supreme
Court rejected the right to assign defense and unanimously held that U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese
companies can not take advantage of the parent’s rights conferred by Article VIII(1). Although
not explicit in the Court’s published opinion, the Supreme Court precluded the subsidiary’s use
of Article VIII(1) upon virtually identical facts and arguments as those before the Seventh Circuit
and, more specifically, upon the subsidiary’s contention that the parent dictated its discriminatory
conduct. Part I describes the background of the parent-right invocation principle in the context
of an Article VIII(1) defense to Title VII claims against Japanese companies. Part I of this Comment sets forth a detailed analysis of the Sumitomo decision. Finally, Part I discusses the cases
which bear on the issue of whether a U.S. subsidiary can invoke its parent’s Article VIII(1) rights.
Part II discusses the background and holding of the Seventh Circuit’s decision Fortino. Part III
demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit erred in both finding an Article VIII(1) right to assign and
in permitting the subsidiary to invoke its parent’s rights to defeat the Title VII claim because neither the FCN Treaty nor the Sumitomo decision permits this result. Part III further illustrates
that after finding an Article VIII(1) right to assign, the court erroneously assumed that the parent’s system of assignment, rather than the subsidiary’s independent conduct, caused the Title VII
violation. Finally, Part III demonstrates that the principle of parent-right invocation rests upon
inapposite theories, violates fundamental principles of U.S. corporate law, and results in illogical
consequences. This Comment concludes that courts should not permit Japanese companies to ignore the corporate form of their U.S. subsidiaries by allowing subsidiaries to invoke their parents’
FCN Treaty rights in defense of Title VII claims.

COMMENTS
FORTINO v. QUASAR CO.: PARENT-RIGHT INVOCATION
OF RIGHTS FOR U.S. SUBSIDIARIES OF JAPANESE
COMPANIES UNDER U.S.-JAPAN TREATY OF
FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION*
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")'
prohibits employers from discriminating in favor of employees

on the basis of race, sex and national origin.2 As Japanese
companies continue to operate in the United States through
wholly-owned U.S.-incorporated subsidiaries, the U.S. employees of these subsidiaries continue to claim Title VII violations
based on the disproportionately high number of Japanese executives the subsidiaries employ. 3 In defense of these Title VII
* This Comment is dedicated to the late Professor Edward Yorio, my mentor.
See Jerry Choe in A Dedication to Edward Yorio, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 803, 816 (1992).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988) (amended 1991). The Civil Rights Act of 1991
amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter Title VII] in various
respects. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The 1991 Act was enacted
to strengthen the federal civil rights laws by providing additional protections against
unlawful discrimination in employment. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(3), 105 Stat.
1071 (1991).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) (amended 1991); see McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976) (stating that Title VII prohibits discriminatory preference).
3. E.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (alleging
disproportionate hiring ofJapanese males); Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th
Cir. 1991) (alleging discriminatory lay-off and disproportionate number of Japanese
executives remaining after reduction in force); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643
F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981) (alleging disproportionate hiring ofJapanese males), vacated
on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982); Mackentire v. Ricoh Corp., 58 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 495, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3318 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (alleging discriminatory lay-off and disproportionate number of Japanese executives remaining after reduction in force); Mattison v. Canon, U.S.A., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1685
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (alleging disproportionate hiring of Japanese males); Porto v. Cannon, U.S.A., 28 Fair. Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1679 (N.D. 11. 1981) (same); EEOC
Decision No. 86-2, 40 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1879 (Nov. 22, 1985) (alleging
that almost half of total number of employees wereJapanese males in upper-management level positions); see Americans Complain of Bias by Japanese Bosses in U.S., N.Y.
TIMEs, June 3, 1991, at AI, col. 5 [hereinafter Bias News] (describing Japanese owned
companies as "top heavy" with Japanese managers and reporting continued expansion of Japanese-owned companies in United States).
The Author does not distinguish between Japanese citizenship and Japanese national origin because this Comment does not concern the extent of the right to dis-
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claims, the subsidiaries argue that they employ Japanese executives because of their parents' practice of assigning their own
executives to manage their U.S. subsidiaries.4 The subsidiaries
contend that their parent companies' assignment practice is
permitted under Article VIII(l) of the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan ("FCN Treaty"),5 which authorizes "companies of [Japan]
criminate under commercial treaties. The Author does, however, assume that discrimination in favor of Japanese executives violates Title VII because Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin and discrimination on any other
bases which has the effect of national origin discrimination or which otherwise causes
an adverse impact on groups of different national origin. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e2(a), (k) (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 86, 88
(1973) (stating that "[c]ertainly, Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of
citizenship whenever it has the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of
national origin"); 29 C.F.R. § 160 6 .5(a) (1991). For persons from homogenous
countries such as Japan, citizenship discrimination clearly has the effect of national
origin discrimination thereby causing an adverse impact on personnel of non-Japanese national origin. Cf MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3d
Cir. 1988) (noting irreconcilability of Title VII with FCN treaty right to discriminate
on the basis of citizenship in case involving persons from homogeneous country). In
addition, the issues contained in this Comment are relevant only insofar as discriminatory practices violate Title VII. For a fuller description of the FCN treaty right to
discriminate, see Scott Mozarsky, Note, Defining Discrimination on the Basis of National
Origin Under Article VIII(l) of the Friendship Treaty Between the United States andJapan, 15
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1099 (1992).

4. See, e.g., Brief for Sumitomo Shoji Am. at 8, 14, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v.
Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (Nos.. 80-2070, 81-24) [hereinafter Brief for
Sumitomo] (alleging that parent company assigned Japanese executives to U.S. subsidiary); Brief of C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 8, 14, Sumitomo
Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (Nos. 80-2070, 81-24) [hereinafter
Brief of C. Itoh] (alleging that parent company assigned Japanese nationals to U.S.
subsidiary for purposes of management and control); Brief for Quasar Co. at 15-19,
Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1991) (Nos. 91-1123, 91-1197, 911564) [hereinafter Brief for Quasar] (arguing exemption from Title VII on basis that
parent company had assigned Japanese executives to managerial positions in U.S.
subsidiary); see also Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 725 F.2d 970, 972 (5th Cir. 1984)
(allegation that Japanese parent exercised right "to engage" Japanese personnel in
U.S. subsidiary by assigning individuals to U.S. subsidiary on temporary basis); Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 103 F.R.D. 562, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (allegation
that Japanese executives in subsidiary were assigned by Japanese parent) on remand
from 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
5. Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art. VIII(I), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070 [hereinafter FCN
Treaty]. Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty provides in pertinent part that
[n]ationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage,
within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their
choice.
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...to engage, within the territories of the [United States]....
executive personnel . . .of their choice." 6
In Fortino v. Quasar Co. ,' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit found that Article VIII(l) gave a Japanese parent company the right to assign Japanese executives to its U.S.
subsidiary8 and permitted the subsididry to invoke its parent's
Article VIII(l) rights to defeat a Title VII claim.9 In Fortino,
U.S. executives brought a discrimination claim against the
wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese company which
had a system of assigning its own executives to manage its U.S.
subsidiary.' 0 As the first court to permit a subsidiary to invoke
its parent's rights under an international treaty, the Seventh
Circuit did so because, through the parent's system of assignment, the parent had "dictated the subsidiary's discriminatory
6. Id.; see, e.g., Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at i, 19-35 (answering question
whether Japanese companies have Article VIII(l) right to control and manage U.S.
investments by engaging executive personnel in affirmative); Remarks of Abram
Chayes, Esq., on behalf of Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., Transcript of Oral Argument at
3 (Apr. 26, 1982), Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (Nos.
80-2070, 81-24) [hereinafter Oral Argument on Behalf of Sumitomo] (arguing that
FCN Treaty places obligation on United States "to permit a foreign investor to manage and control its investment in this country by engaging executive and other specialists of its choice"); Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 21 (describing Article VIII(I)
as privilege of Japanese companies to staff their U.S. subsidiaries); Brief for Quasar,
supra note 4, at 15-19 (arguing that parent company had right to assign pursuant to
Article VIII(l)); see also Spiess, 725 F.2d at 972 (allegation that Japanese parent has
right "to engage" Japanese personnel in U.S. subsidiary); Avigliano, 103 F.R.D. at
579.
The U.S. courts of appeal are in conflict regarding the right to discriminate by
virtue of Article VIII(l)'s "of their choice" provision. See infra note 40. This Comment does not consider the right to discriminate under Article VIII(l) by virtue of
the "of their choice" provision but only the right to assign by virtue of Article
VIII(l)'s "to engage" provision.
7. 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
8. Id. at 392. After quoting the text of Article VIII(l), the court stated that
"[t]he propriety of [the parent's] assigning its own executives to [its U.S. subsidiary]
is further confirmed by the issuance of E-1 and E-2 visas to the Japanese expatriate
executives." Id. The court's clear implication is that Article VIII(l) confirms the propriety of theJapanese parent's assignment of its executives to its U.S. subsidiary. See
U.S. Bias Decision Voided by Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1991, at A25, Col. 3 (reporting
statement by Paul Bressan, attorney for Quasar Co. that Seventh Circuit's "ruling
was significant because it allowed American subsidiaries of foreign companies to cite
the FCN Treaty rights of their parent company in assigning people to top management jobs") [hereinafter Bias Decision].
9. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393.
10. Id. at 392.
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conduct."" The court permitted the subsidiary's defense
based upon the parent's alleged Article VIII(l) right to assign
and allowed the subsidiary to invoke its parent's FCN Treaty
rights to defeat the Title VII claim.
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Fortino undermined the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano.II In Sumitomo, the Supreme
Court rejected the right to assign defense and unanimously
held that U.S. subsidiaries ofJapanese companies can not take
advantage of the parent's rights conferred by Article VIII(1).t
Although not explicit in the Court's published opinion, the
Supreme Court precluded the subsidiary's use of Article
VIII(l) upon virtually identical facts and arguments as those
before the Seventh Circuit and, more specifically, upon the
subsidiary's contention that the parent dictated its discriminatory conduct.' 4 Part I describes the background of the parentright invocation principle in the context of an Article VIII(l)
defense to Title VII claims againstJapanese companies. Part I
of this Comment sets forth a detailed analysis of the Sumitomo
decision. Finally, Part I discusses the cases which bear on the
issue of whether a U.S. subsidiary can invoke its parent's Article VIII(l) rights. Part II discusses the background and holding of the Seventh Circuit's decision Fortino. Part III demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit erred in both finding an Article
VIII(l) right to assign and in permitting the subsidiary to invoke its parent's rights to defeat the Title VII claim because
neither the FCN Treaty nor the Sumitomo decision permits this
result. Part III further illustrates that after finding an Article
VIII(l) right to assign, the court erroneously assumed that the
parent's system of assignment, rather than the subsidiary's in11. Id. at 393.
12. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
13. Id. at 188, 189 (stating that subsidiaries "are entitled to the rights, and subject to the responsibilities of other [U.S.] corporations" and that "[t]he only significant advantage branches may have over subsidiaries is that conferred by Article
VIII(l)"); see In rejapanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 319,
324 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that "[t]he national status of the company determines
whether that company may claim the benefit conferred by Article VIII"), cert. granted
on other grounds, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 471 U.S.
1002 (1985).
14. The Author reviewed court briefs, the oral argument transcript, and the record contained in the parties' joint appendix to their briefs.
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dependent conduct, caused the Title VII violation. Finally,
Part III demonstrates that the principle of parent-right invocation rests upon inapposite theories, violates fundamental principles of U.S. corporate law, and results in illogical consequences. This Comment concludes that courts should not permit Japanese companies to ignore the corporate form of their
U.S. subsidiaries by allowing subsidiaries to invoke their parents' FCN Treaty rights in defense of Title VII claims.
I. PARENT-RIGHT INVOCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF AN
ARTICLE VIII(l) DEFENSE TO TITLE VII CLAIMS
AGAINST JAPANESE COMPANIES
Title VII discrimination suits against Japanese-owned
companies recur in similar factual settings due to the uniform
manner in which Japanese companies operate in the United
States. 5 In Sumitomo,' 6 the U.S. Supreme Court resolved Title
VII claims against the wholly-owned U.S. subsidiaries of two of
Japan's largest companies, each with similar systems of assignment.' 7 Despite the subsidiaries' contention that Article
VIII(l) gave their parents the right to engage the executives
causing the alleged discrimination, the Court held that because
U.S. subsidiaries have the same rights and responsibilities of
other U.S. companies, they cannot take advantage of the rights
conferred in Article VIII(l).' 8 However, due to a footnote in
the Supreme Court's opinion,' 9 commentators have developed
theories according to which U.S. subsidiaries ofJapanese companies can take advantage of Article VIII(l) by invoking their
parents' Article VIII(l) rights.2 0 Aside from the theories, two
reported cases also bear on the issue of whether a U.S. subsidiary is able to invoke its parent's treaty rights.2 '
A. The Japanese MultinationalOperation
U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese companies often face Title
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
whether
20.
21.

See infra text accompanying notes 22-38.
457 U.S. 176 (1982).
See infra text accompanying notes 45-97.
See infra text accompanying notes 56-72, 84-94.
Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189 n.19 (stating that Court "express[es] no view as to
Sumitomo may assert any Article VIII(l) rights of its parent").
See infra text accompanying notes 98-120.
See infra text accompanying notes 121-141.
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VII discrimination charges due to the disproportionate
number of Japanese personnel occupying management-level
positions within the subsidiaries.22 This imbalance may result
from the way Japanese companies structure their multinational
operations. 3
1. Management Through Systems of Assignment
Japanese companies uniformly manage their U.S. subsidiaries by assigning their own executives to their subsidiaries. 4
The assignments are made through in-house "rotation" systems by which Japanese companies train and educate executive
personnel before assigning them to their U.S. subsidiaries.2 5
The assignments are temporary, lasting from two to five years,
and enable the executives to retain their long-term status as
employees of the parent. 26 The parent companies often evaluate the performance of the assigned executives and determine
22. See supra note 3 (listing cases).
23. See ToYOHIRo KONO, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE OF JAPANESE ENTERPRISES
164-66 (1984) (describing management of subsidiaries outside of Japan); See, e.g.,
Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1991) (describing system of Matsushita Electric Industrial Company); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 725 F.2d 970,
972 (5th Cir. 1984) (describing system of Japanese company C. Itoh & Co., Ltd.);
Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 103 F.R.D. 562, 569, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(describing assignment of rotational executives of Japanese company) on remandfrom
457 U.S. 176 (1982); EEOC Decision No. 86-2, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1879,
1879 (Nov. 22, 1985).
24. E.g., Spiess, 725 F.2d at 972; Avigliano, 103 F.R.D. at 569, 579; EEOC Decision,
40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1879; see TARASHI KiUCHI, Strategyfor Overseas Markets, in THE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE 123 (1985); KONO, supra note 23, at 164-166;
NATOTO SASAKI, MANAGEMENT AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN JAPAN 124 (1981).
25. See MAX ELI, JAPAN INC.: GLOBAL STRATEGIES OF JAPANESE TRADING CORPORATIONS 99 (1991); KONO, supra note 23, at 166; YOSHINARA KUNIO, SOGO SHOSHA:
THE VANGUARD OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 231-232 (1982); SASAKI, supra note 24, at
33-38, 41, 47-48, 124 (discussing rotation program ofJapanese trading companies);

e.g., Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392; Spiess, 725 F.2d at 972; Avigliano, 103 F.R.D. at 569, 579;
Horton v. Toyota, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1371, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

20046, *1 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (alleging that subsidiary was used as "rotating ground"
for Japanese executives); EEOC Decision, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1879.
26. See KONO, supra note 23 at 166; KUNIO, supra note 25, at 232; SASAKI, supra
note 24, at 124 (stating that assignment lasts two to three years); id. at 41, 47
(describing life-time employment with the parent); see, e.g., Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392
(describing system as temporary); Spiess, 725 F.2d at 972 (describing three to five year
assignment period); EEOC Decision, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1879 (stating
that "[rnotational employees are permanent employees of [the subsidiary's] overseas
parent who have been temporarily assigned to fill upper-level management positions
at the [subsidiary]").
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their salaries and promotions during the period of their assignment. 7 The executives' immediate families may accompany
them during their temporary assignment in the United States
until they are rotated back to Japan. 28 Japanese executives assigned to U.S. subsidiaries generally apply for non-immigrant
"E" visas to gain entry into the United States.2 9 The provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") and its
implementing U.S. State Department regulations authorize the
issuance of "E" visas to applicants who will perform supervisory or executive work for companies in the United States that
have substantial trade or investment relations with Japan so
long as the applicant will perform work authorized by the FCN
Treaty. °
2. The Choice to Operate Through U.S. Subsidiaries Rather
Than U.S. Branches
Japanese companies operating in the United States generally choose to do so through wholly-owned U.S.-incorporated
subsidiaries rather than through U.S. branches. 3 1 Under tradi27. See e.g., Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392; Spiess, 725 F.2d at 973 (alleging that Japanese trading company parent determines the positions of each executive assigned to
U.S. subsidiary as well as determining compensation and promotions); cf. Adames v.
Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 751 F. Supp. 1548, 1553 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (allegation thatJapanese parent determines salaries for executives assigned to U.S. branch, including
compensation for costs associated with living in United States).
28. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E) (1988 & 1992 Supp.); e.g., Fortino v. Quasar
Co., 950 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1991).
29. See, e.g., Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392 (describing "E"-visa status of executives of
U.S. subsidiary of Matsushita); Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 8 (describing
"E"-I treaty trader status of U.S. subsidiary of Sumitomo Shoji); Reply Brief for
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. at 18, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176
(1982) (Nos. 80-2070, 81-24) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Sumitomo] (stating that
"the positions in controversy are occupied by Japanese nationals carrying E-I FCN
Treaty trader visas"); cf.Adames, 751 F. Supp. at 1553 (stating allegations that Japanese executives assigned to U.S. branch were admitted as "E" visa treaty traders).
30. See 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(E) (1988 & 1992 Supp.); 22 C.F.R. § 41.51
(1991); Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392.
31. See supra note 3 (listing cases involving wholly-owned U.S. incorporated subsidiaries of Japanese companies); see also ELI, supra note 25, at 100 (depicting table of
controlled overseas companies by Japanese trading firms). As do other multinational
companies,Japanese companies typically establish one main wholly-owned subsidiary
in the United States named after the parent, which then branches out into several
divisions throughout the United States. Telephone Interview with Yoshi Tsurumi,
Professor of International Business, Baruch College, May 20, 1992 (notes available at
office of Fordham InternationalLaw Journal). The advantage of branching out across

the United States rather than creating legally distinct subsidiaries is the tight control
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tional principles of U.S. corporate law, or "entity" law, when
establishing U.S. subsidiaries, even if wholly-owned, Japanese
companies create separate and distinct legal entities with independent substantive rights and duties.3 2 Japanese companies establishing U.S. branches, on the other hand, do not create separate juridical entities because a company and its
branch are one and the same company.
Operating through U.S. subsidiaries rather than U.S.
branches provides non-U.S. companies with the advantages of
separate incorporation.3 4 As an entity separate from the U.S.
subsidiary, the non-U.S. company does not expose itself to the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts.3 5 Moreover, as with any parentsubsidiary relationship, the non-U.S. company generally takes
no responsibility for the acts of its subsidiaries. Moreover, its
liability is generally limited to the extent of its investment in
that a main U.S. subsidiary is able to maintain over its operations around the United
States. At the same time, the Japanese company is able to retain control over the
main U.S. subsidiary's operations because it wholly owns the main subsidiary.
32. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925) (stating
that "existence of [wholly-owned subsidiary] as a distinct corporate entity is, however, in all respects observed"); Krane v. Gravely Motor Plow & Cultivator Co., 69
N.Y.S.2d 175 (App. Div. 1947); Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 65,
67 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: STATUTORY LAW GENERAL at xxxix (1989); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw § 414 cmt. a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (stating that "a foreign subsidiary .

.

. is .

.

. a distinct juridicial entity").

33. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, at § 414 cmt. a (stating that "[u]nlike a foreign subsidiary, a foreign branch is not a distinct juridical entity"); C. ROHRLICH,
ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 10.01 (5th ed. rev.
1983) (stating that branch is not legal entity separate from parent); see, e.g. Adames v.
Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 751 F. Supp. 1548 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (Japanese bank establishing U.S. branch).
34. See Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353, 369 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Reavley, J., dissenting), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982); Avigliano v.
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting United
States v. R. P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1957) that a Japanese
company surrenders its Japanese identity when it establishes a U.S. subsidiary), aff'd
on other grounds, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176
(1982).
35. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 414(2) (stating that "[a] state may not
ordinarily regulate activities of corporations organized under the laws of a foreign
state on the basis that they are owned or controlled by nationals of the regulating
state"); see also Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1334
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that "[the parent-subsidiary relationship has not in itself
been treated as sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the foreign parent").
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the subsidiary. 36 On the other hand, if the non-U.S. company
had chosen to operate in the United States through a U.S.
branch, the non-U.S. company's presence in the United States
would bring the non-U.S. parent within the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. 37 The parent company would be liable for all acts of
the U.S. branch because the U.S. branch is part of the same
non-U.S. company. 8
B. Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty
U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese companies facing Title VII
suits by their employees have repeatedly attempted to defeat
the claims using Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty. 39 Article
VIII(I) provides, in pertinent part, that "companies of [Japan]
shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the
[United States], executive personnel . . . of their choice." 4 °
These subsidiaries have attempted to utilize Article VIII(l) in
36. See

PHILLIP

I.

BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE

LAw § 1.02 (1987).
37. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCE-

§§ 3.03, 3.04.2, 3.08, 4.05 (1983) (describing "presence" and "doing
business" standards for jurisdiction); Bulova Watch Co., 508 F. Supp. at 1333-46 (analyzing "doing business" requirements of jurisdiction).
38. See ROHRLICH, supra note 33, § 10.01 (stating that branch is not legal entity
separate from parent); see also Coulliard v. Bank of New Mexico, 548 P.2d 459, 462-63
(N.M. 1976) (stating that term "branch" creates relationship of principal and agent
between parent and branch).
39. See e.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); Spiess
v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S.
1128 (1982); Mattison v. Canon, U.S.A., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1685 (N.D.
Ill.
1981); Porto v. Cannon, U.S.A., 28 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1679 (N.D. Ill.
1981); EEOC Decision No. 86-2, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1879 (Nov. 22,
1985).
40. FCN Treaty, supra note 6, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070. The right to discriminate by
virtue of Article VIII(1)'s "of their choice" provision is an unresolved issue in the
several U.S. circuit courts, although the prevailing view holds that the FCN Treaty
permits discrimination only on the basis of citizenship, not national origin. Compare
MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that Article
VIII(l) permits discrimination on the basis of citizenship but not national origin) and
Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984) (same) with Spiess v. C. Itoh
& Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), (holding that Article VIII(l) provides
blanket immunity from Title VII claims), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982)
and Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated on
other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (holding that Article VIII(l) provides no right to
discriminate in violation of Title VII although defense under "bona fide occupational
qualification" exception is relaxed for companies able to assert Article VIII(l)). For
further discussion, see Mozarsky, Note, supra note 3.
DURAL LAw
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two ways depending on which companies (the subsidiaries or
their parents) the subsidiaries allege exercised the Article
VIII(l) right "to engage" executive personnel of their
choice. 4 The subsidiaries have argued that they (the subsidiaries) exercised their right "to engage" executive personnel of
their choice when they hired or employed the Japanese executives.4 2 The subsidiaries have also argued that their parents exercised their right "to engage" executive personnel of their
choice by assigning Japanese executives to manage their subsidiaries.4 3 The difference between the two applications of Article VIII(l) is whether "to engage" means to hire or employ
or whether it means to assign or send.44
C. The Sumitomo Decision
The repeated attempts by U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese
companies to take advantage of Article VIII(l) were shut down
by the 1982 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Sumitomo Shoji Am.,
Inc. v. Avigliano.45 The Sumitomo case and the case of Spiess v. C.
Itoh & Co. (Am.)46 involved Title VII claims against whollyowned U.S.-incorporated subsidiaries of two of Japan's largest
and most well-known multinational companies, Sumitomo
Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha ("Sumitomo Japan") and C. Itoh &
41. Compare Spiess, 643 F.2d at 355 (describing subsidiary's allegation that Article
VIII(l)'s language permitting companies to engage personnel "of their choice"
cloaks subsidiary with immunity) with Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 25
(describing reason for Article VIII(l) right of Japanese investor to engage key personnel of their choice) and Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 725 F.2d 970, 972 (5th Cir.
1984) (describing subsidiary's allegation that Japanese parent had exercised its right
to engage managerial and other specialists in its U.S. subsidiary).
42. See, e.g., Spiess, 643 F.2d at 363 (stating that Article VIII(l) permits the U.S.
subsidiary "to hire only Japanese personnel for executive and technical positions").
43. See e.g., Fortino v. Quasar, 950 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that
propriety ofJapanese parent corporation's act of "assigning" its own executives to its
U.S. subsidiary is confirmed by text of Article VIII(l)); Spiess, 725 F.2d at 971
(describing allegation that as exercise of Article VIII(l) right, parent assigns Japanese executives to work for U.S. subsidiary). Avigliano, 638 F.2d at 554-55 (stating
that Article VIII(l) was intended "to facilitate the [parent's] staffing of overseas operations").
44. Compare Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 469 F. Supp. 1, 2 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
(stating that Article VIII(l) creates right to hire), rev'd, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982) with Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392 (stating that

propriety ofJapanese parent corporation's act of "assigning" its own executives to its
U.S. subsidiary is confirmed by text of Article VIII(l)).
45. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
46. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
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Co., Ltd. ("C. Itoh Japan"). 47 Like all Japanese multinational
companies, each company had systems of regularly assigning
their own executives to manage their U.S. subsidiaries. 48 Despite the subsidiaries' contentions that their parent companies
had assigned the executives pursuant to their Article VIII(l)
rights, the Supreme Court, resolving both cases through its
Sumitomo holding, 49 precluded the subsidiaries from taking advantage of Article VIII(l).
1. The Facts
In Sumitomo, female secretarial employees of Sumitomo
Shoji Am., Inc. ("Sumitomo"), the wholly-owned subsidiary of
Sumitomo Japan, brought a class action against Sumitomo
claiming that its practice of exclusively hiring Japanese males
for management-level positions violated Title VII. 50 In support of a motion to dismiss the complaint,5 Sumitomo alleged
that its parent had assigned its own executives to Sumitomo in
an effort to manage and control its U.S. subsidiary. 2 Like
other Japanese companies, these Japanese executives were assigned on a rotating basis. 53 They retained their long-term sta47. See Lawrence B. Krause & Sueo Sekiguchi, Japan and the World Economy, in
ASIA'S NEW GIANT: HOW THE JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKs 383, 392 (Hugh Patrick &
Henry Rosovsky eds., 1976) (describing firms as being among largest trading companies).
48. See Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 8; Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 2.
49. See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. 176; Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 457 U.S. 1128
(1982) (vacating judgment and remanding case for further consideration in light of
Sumitomo).
50. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 178.
51. Id. at 179. Because the case was decided on a motion to dismiss, there was
no record of facts in the case.
52. Affidavit ofJ. Portis Hicks in Support of Motion, Joint Appendix to Briefs at
74a, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (Nos. 80-2070, 8124) [hereinafter affidavit of J. Portis Hicks] (stating that "[flor purposes of
Sumitomo's operations in the United States . . . many qualified Japanese nationals
have been, and still are assigned to Sumitomo by its parent company ... to serve in
executive . . . positions"); Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that "[i]n
accordance with the general practice of sogo shosha [Japanese trading companies],
Sumitomo's Japanese parent sends members of its organization to fill key positions
in Sumitomo"); id. at 14 (stating that "Japanese nationals [were] assigned to it by its
parent company in Japan"); cf. Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that
Sumitomo's parent assigns Japanese executives for "purposes of management and
control"); Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 103 F.R.D. 562, 569, 579 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (alleging that Japanese executives were "rotating staff" assigned by Japanese
parent) on remandfrom 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
53. Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that Japanese parent trains

1991-1992]

PARENT-RIGHT INVOCATION

1141

tus as employees of the parent and returned to the parent after
their temporary assignment was completed.5 4 All of these executives allegedly' 55entered the United States under "E" visas as
"treaty traders."

2. Sumitomo's Asserted Right to Assign Defense
In brief and by oral argument, Sumitomo argued that the
FCN Treaty gave its parent the right to manage and control its
U.S. subsidiary by engaging executive personnel of its choice;
Sumitomo contended that the subsidiary should be given Article VIII(l) protection against a Title VII claim because liability
placed on the subsidiary would derogate the parent's FCN
Treaty rights.56
Sumitomo based its argument on a relation among several
executives and rotates them throughout the various divisions of the company as well
as to offices in Japan); Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that Sumitomo
Japan, like other trading companies, had a rotation system of assigning executives);
Avigliano, 103 F.R.D. at 579 (describing allegations that Japanese executives were
"rotating staff" assigned by Japanese parent).
54. Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 2.
55. Affidavit of Portis Hicks, supra note 52, at 74a (stating that assigned executives were "treaty trader" personnel); Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 29, at 18
(stating that "the positions in controversy are occupied by Japanese nationals carrying E-1 treaty trader visas"); Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that
"[t]hese personnel are admitted to the United States as 'treaty traders' under nonimmigrant E-I visas"); Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 2 (explaining that Sumitomo's
managerial staff is comprised of Japanese nationals who entered as non-immigrant
treaty traders).
56. See Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at i, 19 (presenting question whether
Japanese companies have Article VIII(l) right to control and manage U.S. investments by engaging executive personnel and answering in affirmative); Reply Brief for
Sumitomo, supra note 29, at 3, 10; Oral Argument on Behalf of Sumitomo, supra note
6, at 3 (arguing in introduction that "this case concerns ... an obligation to permit a
foreign investor to manage and control its investment in this country by engaging
executive and other specialists of its choice"); see also Brief for Sumitomo, supra note
4, at 25 (stating that if host country can limit right of foreign investor to engage key
personnel, "it would severely undercut the ability of investors to control and mange
their investments");Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 21 (describing Article VIII(l) as
privilege of Japanese companies to staff their U.S. subsidiaries).
Several amicus briefs were filed on behalf of Sumitomo, each developing the
similar "right to engage" arguments. See Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 21 (right
"to staff"); Brief of the Japan External Trade Organization as Amicus Curiae at 12-13,
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (Nos. 80-2070, 81-24)
(right "to send"); Brief of East Asiatic Company, Ltd., the East Asiatic Company,
Inc., and Heidelberg Eastern, Inc. at iv, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457
U.S. 176 (1982) (Nos. 80-2070, 81-24) (right "to appoint").
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Articles of the FCN Treaty.5 7 Sumitomo explained that under
Article VII(1) of the FCN Treaty, Japanese companies have the
right to establish branches and subsidiaries in the United
States and the right to "control and manage" those enterprises. 58 The Article VIII(l) right to engage executive personnel is, therefore, merely an elaboration of the Article VII(l)
right of management and control. 59 Further, Sumitomo explained that Article I(1) of the FCN Treaty relates to Articles
VIII(l) and VII(l) because Article I(1) permits executives sent
by the Japanese company to enter the United States to carry on
substantial trade between the United States and Japan.6 °
Sumitomo argued that the "E" visa status of its Japanese
executives demonstrated that their employment resulted from
its parent's proper exercise of its Article VIII(I) rights. 6 '
Sumitomo argued that the INA and its implementing State Department regulations governing the issuance of "E" visas effectuate the FCN Treaty Article I(1) right of entry and the Article
VIII(l) right to engage executive personnel because both sets
of provisions permit entry into the United States for individuals who will perform executive or supervisory work for compa57. See generally Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 10-19; Reply Brief for
Sumitomo, supra note 29, at 10-19; Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 6-11.
58. Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 21; Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra
note 29, at 18; see Brief of C. Itoh as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 8, 21; see also FCN
Treaty, supra note 5, art. VII(l), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2069.
59. Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 21; Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra
note 29, at 18 (stating that what is implicit in Article VII(l) is made explicit in Article
VIII(l)); see Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 8, 21.
60. Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 21-22; id. at 28 (describing "linkage"
between Article I(I) and Article VIII(I)); Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 29, at
10-11 (explaining that Article I(I) must be "read together" with Article VII(1) and
Article VIII(l)); see Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 8; FCN Treaty, supra note 5, art.
1(1), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2066.
61. See Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 29, at 10-13; Brief for Sumitomo,
supra note 4, at 32-35. After explaining that the FCN Treaty permits Japanese companies to manage and control their U.S. subsidiaries by engaging executive personnel of their choice, Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 29, at 10-11, Sumitomo
argued that "E-visas are only issued to the key executives and specialists [listed in
Article VIII] necessary for the investor to manage and control its U.S. enterprise."
Id. at 13. According to Sumitomo, "the question whether a particular Sumitomo employee falls within the protection of Article VIII(l) . . . depends on whether that
employee has been able to demonstrate to the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service that he is entitled to hold an E-1 visa." Id. at 12. In
other words, the issuance of E- I visas to its Japanese executives demonstrated that
any particular executive was "engaged" pursuant to the parent's Article VIII(l)
rights.

1991-1992]

PARENT-RIGHT INVOCATION

1143

nies in the United States when the purpose of entry is to carry
on substantial trade between the United States and Japan.6 2
By inferring the connection between the issuance of "E" visas
and the parent's right to engage executive personnel,
Sumitomo argued that the "E" visa status of its Japanese executives conclusively demonstrated that the Japanese executives
63
were engaged pursuant to Article VIII(l).

After showing that Japanese companies have the right to
engage Japanese executives in the United States, Sumitomo
emphasized that the Japanese companies' FCN Treaty rights
are effective whether the company operated through a U.S.
branch or a U.S. subsidiary. 64 Sumitomo argued that under
the FCN Treaty, the legal form of the parent's U.S. investment
is not significant. 65 Although Sumitomo recognized that juridical formalities normally govern the rights of companies under
treaties,66 Sumitomo argued that the main objective of the
FCN Treaty is to permit Japanese investors to choose the form
ofU.S. investments
without sacrificing their rights to control
67
the enterprises.

According to Sumitomo, the FCN Treaty ig-

nores the legal form of U.S. subsidiaries, or "pierces the corporate veil," for the purpose of making the Japanese company's economic interest in U.S. investments the justification
and basis for FCN Treaty protection.6" Sumitomo argued that
Article VIII(l) must protect subsidiaries from Title VII
claims. 69 According to Sumitomo, holding otherwise would
undercut and cause the derogation of its parent's treaty
rights.70 The parent's rights would be ineffective if the subsidi62. Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 28-29; Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra
note 29, at II n.8, 12; see Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 9-10.
63. See Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 29, at 12.
64. See id. at 10; Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 21.
65. See Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 29, at 10; Brief of C. Itoh, supra
note 4, at 21.
66. Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 29, at 6.
67. Id. at 7.
68. Id. at 6-7; see Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 39-40; Brief of C. Itoh,
supra note 4, at 10-11.
69. See Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 19-41; Reply Brief for Sumitomo,
supra note 29, at 1-19.
70. Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 30 (stating in support of Article VIII
protection that if plaintiffs prevailed against the subsidiary, "there would be no doubt
that the result would be a significant derogation from [the foreign investor's] FCN
Treaty rights"); id. at 25 (stating in support of Article VIII(l) protection that if host
country can limit right of foreign investor to engage key personnel, "it would se-
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ary were found liable for the parent's employment practices. 7
Sumitomo, a U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese corporation, argued
that it was a "company of Japan" entitled to invoke Article
72
VIII(l).
3. The Decision by the Court of Appeals: Acknowledging
the Right to Assign Defense
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted
Sumitomo's analysis of the FCN Treaty.7 3 The court held that,
because the Japanese parent had the right to manage and control its U.S. subsidiary by staffing it with executives of its
choice, the U.S. subsidiary of ajapanese company must be permitted to invoke Article VIII(l) as a "company of Japan.' 7
The Second Circuit found that the purpose of Article
VIII(l) and 1(1) of the FCN Treaty is to facilitate the Japanese
parent's "staffing of its overseas operations. '7' The right
under Article VIII(l) was, according to the court, "unitary"
with the Article VII(1) right to manage and control U.S. enterprises. 76 Finally, the court recognized that the State Department regulations governing the issuance of "E" visas are intended to facilitate the entry of Japanese nationals who will
work for Japanese trading "units" set up in the United States
pursuant to the Article VII(l) right to organize U.S. branches
and subsidiaries.7 7
verely undercut the ability of investors to control and mange their investments"); see
Brief of C. Itoh, supra note 4, at 22.
71. Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 26 (stating in support of Article VIII
protection that "for the right to control to be effective, the investor must be free to
choose management personnel").
72. Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 35-41; Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra
note 29, at 1-10.
73. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am. Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 554-56 (2d Cir.
1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
74. See id. at 554, 556, 557 (finding Article VIII(l) "staffing" right unitary with
Article VII right to manage and control, finding it unlikely that FCN Treaty would
grant rights and then bar subsidiaries from invoking Article VIII(l), and holding that
Sumitomo was "company of Japan").
75. See id. at 554-55, 559 (quoting Article VII(l) and stating that Articles VIII(l)
and I(l) were meant to "facilitate the staffing of overseas operations" and stating that
Article VIII(l) allows companies of either party to engage executive personnel of
their choice when operating in the other Party).
76. Avigliano, 638 F.2d at 554-55 (stating that Articles VII(l) and VIII(l) are
"unitary" and that Article VII(l) contains the right to manage U.S. subsidiaries).
77. Id. at 554.
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The Second Circuit held that the Japanese parent's treaty
rights apply equally whether the parent chooses to operate
through a U.S. branch or through a U.S. subsidiary. 8 The
purpose of the FCN Treaty, the court held, is to allow Japanese
companies to protect their investments in both branches and
subsidiaries. 79 The court found that if the FCN Treaty were
construed so that the Japanese company forfeited its rights
when operating through a subsidiary, the company could easily
circumvent the construction by transforming its subsidiary into
a branch.8 0 Finding it unlikely that the FCN Treaty would permit Japanese companies to manage U.S. subsidiaries while depriving the subsidiaries of the parent's ability to invoke the
was a
FCN Treaty's protections, the court held that Sumitomo
"company of Japan" protected by Article VIII(I). 8s
In its analysis, the court addressed the definitional section
of the FCN Treaty under Article XXII(3), according to which
companies "constituted under" the laws of the United States
are U.S. companies, not companies of Japan. a2 Although
Sumitomo was constituted under U.S. laws, the court nevertheless permitted Sumitomo to invoke Article VIII(l) as a "company of Japan." The court believed that Article XXII(3) defined a company's nationality by its place of incorporation only
for the purpose of recognizing its status as a legal entity within
the territories of either treaty country, but not for the purpose
of defining substantive rights under the FCN Treaty. 3
4. The Case in the Supreme Court: Reversing the Second
Circuit on the Issue
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Sumitomo again
stressed its primary "company of Japan" method of invoking
Article VIII(l). 4 However, Sumitomo added an alternative
"parent's right" method of invoking Article VIII(I) for the first
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 556.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 556, 557-58.

82. See id. at 556-57; FCN Treaty, supra note 5, art. XXII(3), 4 U.S.T. 2063,
2079-80.
83. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).

84. See Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4; Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra note

1146 FORDHAMINTERNA TIONAL L WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:1130
time in the case. 85 Sumitomo argued that even if the U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese company is not a "company of Japan"
under Article VIII(l), the subsidiary can still invoke Article
VIII(l) by invoking the Article VIII(l) rights of its parent. 86
The Supreme Court limited its interpretation to the FCN
Treaty between the United States and Japan.8 7 The Court examined the language of the FCN Treaty's definitional section
as well as the intent of the treaty signatories and concluded
that Sumitomo was not a "company ofJapan. ' 88 According to
the Court, both analyses mandated that courts utilize a placeof-incorporation test to determine the nationality of corporations. 89 The Supreme Court held that because Sumitomo was
incorporated in the United States, it was a U.S. company rather
than a Japanese company. 90
According to the Court, a company's nationality determined not only its legal status in either country, but also determined its ability to invoke the substantive rights under the
FCN Treaty.9 ' The Court held that as U.S. companies, U.S.incorporated subsidiaries are "entitled to the rights, and subject to the responsibilities of other domestic corporations." 92
As U.S. companies, U.S. subsidiaries can not take advantage of
the rights conferred in Article VIII(l);9 3 only U.S. branches
can exercise a parent's Article VIII(I) rights.9 4
In response to Sumitomo's alternative "parent's right"
method of asserting Article VIII(l) protection, the Supreme
Court stated in a footnote that it "express[ed] no view as to
whether Sumitomo may assert any Article VIII(1) rights of its
85. See Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 5, at 35-4 1; Reply Brief for Sumitomo,
supra note 35, at 1-10.
86. Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 29, at 3; Brief for Sumitomo, supra
note 4, at 40-41 (stating that "[a] slightly different technical approach is to treat the
U.S. subsidiary as asserting the rights of its Japanese parent, which is admittedly a
company of Japan' ").
87. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 & n.12 (1982).
88. Id. at 180-89.
89. Id. at 182, 185.
90. Id. at 182.
91. Id at 182-83.
92. Id.at 188.
93. Id. at 189 ("[t]he only significant advantage branches may have over subsidiaries is that conferred by Article VIII(l)").
94. Id. at 182 (stating that "[c]learly, Article VIII(l) only applies to companies of
one of the FCN Treaty countries operating in the other country").
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parent."' 9 5 Despite the Supreme Court's holding that U.S. subsidiaries cannot take advantage of the rights conferred by Article VIII(l), commentators have interpreted the footnote as
leaving open the possibility that a subsidiary might take advantage of Article VIII(l) by invoking its parent's Article VIII(l)
rights. 96 Although it is unlikely that the Court intended to
leave the issue open, 97 several theories have emerged attempt95. Id. at 189 n.19.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 98-120 (discussing theories).
97. The manner in which the parent's-right approach was raised demonstrates
that the Court simply did not reach the issue of whether a subsidiary can invoke its
parent's FCN Treaty rights. Sumitomo had raised its parent-right method of invoking Article VIII(l) for the very first time in its Petitioner's Brief when in made the
singular statement that "[a] slightly different technical approach is to treat the U.S.
subsidiary as asserting the rights of its Japanese parent." Brief for Sumitomo, supra
note 4, at 40-4 1; see Interview with Lewis M. Steel, Esq., Partner of Steel, Bellman &
Ritz, Counsel for Plaintiffs, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176
(1982), in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 20, 1992) (notes available at office of Fordham International Law Journal). Plaintiff-Respondents did not respond to Sumitomo's singular
statement due to its less than meritorious appeal. See Interview with Lewis M. Steel,
supra (stating that "[w]e thought that it was of such slight merit that we never responded to it"). Then in its Reply Brief, Sumitomo very forcefully and elaborately
argued the issue. See Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 29, at 3-10. Sumitomo
also raised the parent's right method of invocation in its oral argument to the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Oral Argument on Behalf of Sumitomo, supra note 6, at 1011.
The most plausible explanation for the sudden, "last minute" method of invoking Article VIII(l) in its Reply Brief was the "panic" Sumitomo's attorneys may have
felt when, between the filing of Sumitomo's Petitioner's Brief and Reply Brief, the
government ofJapan made its first statement in regard to the case on Feb. 26, 1982
stating that a U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese company was not covered by Article
VIII(l). See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 183-84; Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4 (filed Jan.
18, 1982); Reply Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 29 (filed Apr. 19, 1982). At this
point, Sumitomo's attorneys knew that it could not rely on its "company of Japan"
method of invoking Article VIII(l). While the Sumitomo case was in the district court,
the U.S. State Department agreed with Sumitomo that Article VIII(l) applies to U.S.
subsidiaries of Japanese companies. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473
F. Supp. 506, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'don other grounds, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). However, before the Second Circuit
heard Sumitomo's appeal, the U.S. State Department took the opposite position. See
Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 558 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated
on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). Therefore, when the Japanese government submitted its statement that U.S. subsidiaries were not covered by Article VIII(l), both
the U.S. and Japanese agencies charged with the duty of treaty interpretation disagreed with Sumitomo's position that it was a company ofJapan. Sumitomo's attorney's knew that it could not rely on the "company of Japan" method of invoking
Article VIII(l).
After hearing the parties' arguments, the Sumitomo Court declined to rule on a
number of issues in the case because they were not set forth or "fairly included" in
the question presented for review by the Supreme Court. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 180
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ing to explain the situations in which U.S. subsidiaries may be
able to invoke their parents' FCN Treaty rights.
D. Theories of Parent-Right Invocation
Three theories attempt to explain the situations in which a
U.S. subsidiary might be permitted invoke its non-U.S. parent's FCN Treaty rights: "integration," "necessity," and thirdparty standing.9 8 Under the "integration" theory of parentright invocation, a U.S. subsidiary may invoke the treaty rights
of its non-U.S. parent when the parent exercises sufficient control over the subsidiary in its business and personnel decisions
to justify treating the two entities as a "common entity."
Under the "necessity" theory, the U.S. subsidiary may assert
its parent's Article VIII(l) rights based on the importance of
n.4, 189 n.19. The parent-right invocation issue was not "fairly included" in the
question presented for review by the Supreme Court. See Cross-Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (No. 81-24)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file) (presenting issue of "[wihether Article VIII(l) ...
which permits nationals and companies of either party to engage executive personnel
of their own choice, is applicable to a domestic corporation which is a wholly owned
subsidiary of aJapanese corporation"). Nor was the issue of parent-right invocation
included in the questions certified by the District Court for interlocutory review by
the Court of Appeals as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See Avigliano v. Sumitomo
Shoji Am., Inc., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas (BNA) 805, 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that
"only the question of the relationship between the treaty and the civil rights law is
suitable for section 1292(b) treatment"). In fact, during oral argument, a member of
the Court panel noted that "the 1292(b) appeal was just on the issue of what kind of a
company is the subsidiary." Remarks of Supreme Court Panel, Transcript of Oral
Argument at 24 (Apr. 26, 1982), Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176
(1982) (Nos. 80-2070, 81-24).
As a result, the Court did not reach the parent's right issue because the issue was
improperly raised. However, the fact that the Court did not consider the parent's
right issue does not mean that the Court failed to consider Sumitomo's defense
based upon its parent's right to assign because the right to assign defense is a basis
for finding that Sumitomo is a company ofJapan. See, e.g., Dushica D. Babich, Note,
DiscriminatoryHiring Practices By Foreign Corporationsin the United States-A Limited Right,
5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 509, 524, 525 (1982) (noting that U.S. subsidiaries ofJapanese
companies should be considered companies ofJapan because FCN Treaty gives parent right to manage and control U.S. enterprises with executives of their choice).
Indeed, the Second Circuit had relied upon the right to assign defense to find that
Sumitomo was a company of Japan. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
98. These theories are a compilation of arguments from commentators who
have advocated the subsidiary's ability to invoke its parent's rights. SeeJohn B. Lewis
& Bruce L. Ottley, Title VII and Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties: Prognostications Based upon Sumitomo Shoji, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 45, 61-68 (1983); Nobuhisa Ishizuka,
Note, Subsidiary Assertion of Foreign Parent Corporation Rights Under Commercial Treaties to
Hire Employees "Of Their Choice, " 86 COLUM. L. REV. 139, 151-68 (1986).
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the discriminatory conduct for which treaty protection is
sought. Finally, under the third-party standing theory, a U.S.
subsidiary may have third-party standing to invoke the Article
VIII(l) rights of its parent because the subsidiary's inability to
invoke the right might materially impair the parent's right to
manage and control its investment in the subsidiary.
1. Integration
According to "integration" theory, U.S. courts should
look beyond the formality of separate incorporation. The
courts should examine the substance of the parent-subsidiary
relationship to determine whether a "single" or "common"
identity between the parent and its subsidiary exists. 99 If there
is a single or common identity between them, the U.S. subsidiary may invoke its parents' Article VIII(l) rights.' 00 Proponents of the integration theory point to the "integrated enterprise" doctrine in employment discrimination law through
which courts treat parent and subsidiary corporations as "single employers" for purposes of Title VII liability.' 0 '
Under the integrated enterprise doctrine, courts may join
parent corporations as defendants and find them liable for the
discriminatory acts of their subsidiaries if the parent and its
subsidiary are so integrated in their operations as to be a "single employer."'10 2 The doctrine, developed by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), permits joinder of the parent
when there exists a high degree of interrelated operations,
common management, centralized control of labor relations,
and common ownership or financial control between the parent and the subsidiary.1 0 3 Based upon the NLRB test, the integration theory of parent-right invocation concludes that when
the parent regularly participates in and exercises a high degree
of control over the personnel and business decisions of its U.S.
99. See Lewis & Ottley, supra note 98, at 62-65, see also Ishizuka, Note, supra note

109, at 152-55.
100. See Lewis & Ottley, supra note 98, at 61 (stating that subsidiary could argue
that the parent and subsidiary are single employer to permit subsidiary to successfully assert "of their choice" provision); see also Ishizuka, Note, supra note 98, at 152.
101. See Lewis & Ottley, supra note 98, at 61-65; see also Ishizuka, Note, supra note
98, at 152-54, nn.94 & 95.
102. See

BARBARA

L.

LAw 1000 (2d ed. 1983).
103. See id.

SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN,

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
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subsidiary, the two entities should be treated as a "common
entity," giving the subsidiary the ability to assert its parent's
FCN Treaty rights.1" 4
2. Necessity
Under the necessity theory of parent-right invocation, the
subsidiary may invoke its parent's FCN Treaty rights to defeat
Title VII liability absent integration. 10 5 The theory permits
parent-right invocation if the discriminatory conduct for which
parent-right invocation is sought is important in light of the
parent's investment in the subsidiary.'0 6 In this analysis,
courts should consider three factors. 10 7 The first concerns the
management level affected by the discriminatory conduct. 10 8
The higher the management level, the greater the need to have
the particular executives in the subsidiary and the more reason
to allow the subsidiary to invoke its parent's FCN Treaty rights
to defeat Title VII claims.'0 9 The second considers the stage
of development of the subsidiary." 0 If the subsidiary is in the
early stages of development, especially in the initial start-up
period, it is purportedly more important for the parent to have
its own executives in the subsidiary to protect its investment.
Thus, there is greater reason to allow the U.S. subsidiary to
invoke its parent's FCN Treaty rights.'
The third factor con2
siders the nature of the industry." Purportedly, for U.S. subsidiaries of multinational industries which closely coordinate
their operations with base offices in the home country, the U.S.
subsidiary's need to place personnel with special training and
knowledge to manage the subsidiary is extremely high.' 13 In
104. See Lewis & Ottley, supra note 98, at 61; see also Ishizuka, Note, supra note
98, at 152-53.
105. See Ishizuka, Note, supra note 98, at 154 (stating even "[wihen there is a
very low degree of integration ... courts should examine the additional criteria...
[which] will indicate whether a subsidiary can appropriately assert a parent's FCN
Treaty right to hire managerial and technical personnel of its choice without potential liability for its hiring decisions").
106. See id.
107. See id. at 155.
108. See id. at 155-59.
109. Id. at 155-56.
110. See id. at 159-60.
111. Id. at 159.
112. See id. at 160-162.
113. Id. at 160-161 (citing Yoshi Tsurumi, The Multinational Spread of Japanese
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sum, the necessity theory of parent-right invocation permits
the subsidiary to assert its parent's FCN Treaty rights to defeat
Title VII claims when the discriminatory conduct is necessary
to protect the parent's investment.
3. Third-Party Standing
Third-party standing is the third ground upon which a
U.S. subsidiary may invoke the Article VIII(l) rights of its nonU.S. parent."I4 The theory is premised on the fact that denying standing would materially impair the parent's FCN Treaty
right to manage and control its U.S. investment because the
subsidiary's liability would restrict the parent's ability to ap-5
point specific managerial personnel to its U.S. subsidiary."
By virtue of such impairment, a U.S. subsidiary arguably may
have third-party standing to assert it's parent's FCN Treaty
6
rights.'

In determining whether a litigant can assert the rights of a
third party, courts traditionally consider the closeness of the
relationship between the litigant and the third party, the ability
of the third party to assert its own rights, and the risk that the
rights of the third party will be materially impaired if thirdparty standing is not permitted." 7 The third-party standing
theory states, however, that there has been a "shift of emphasis
to the third factor."" 8l The theory relies upon Supreme Court
precedent stating that a litigant has standing to assert a third
party's rights so long as the prohibition against invocation
would impair the third-party's interests. 1 9 Because imposition
Firms and Asian Neighbors Reactions, in THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND SOCIAL
CHANCE 118, 143 (D. Apter & L. Goodman eds. 1976)) (stating that executives in
trading industry must understand complexities of international trade as well as the
Japanese market).
114. See Lewis & Ottley, supra note 98, at 65-68; Ishizuka, Note, supra note 98, at
151 n.87.
115. See Lewis & Ottley, supra note 98, at 68; Ishizuka, Note, supra note 98, at
151 n.87.
116. See Ishizuka, Note, supra note 98, at 151 n.87; see also Lewis & Ottley, supra
note 98, at 68.
117. Ishizuka, Note, supra note 98, at 151 n.87; see also Lewis & Ottley, supra note
98, at 66-67.
118. See Ishizuka, Note, supra note 98, at 151 n.87; see also Lewis & Ottley, supra
note 98, at 66.
119. See Ishizuka, Note, supra note 98, at 151 n.87 (stating that "[t]he Supreme
Court has stated that evidence of indirect impairment of third parties' constitutional
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of Title VII liability allegedly would materially impair the parent's right to control and manage its investment in the subsidiary, the theory argues that a U.S. subsidiary should be able to
invoke its parent's FCN Treaty rights to defeat Title VII
20
claims. 1
E. Cases Bearing on the Resolution of Whether a U.S. Subsidiary
Can Invoke Its Parent's Treaty Rights
Two cases particularly bear on the issue of whether a U.S.
subsidiary is able to invoke the FCN Treaty rights of its parent.
First, the Spiess 121 case on remand from the Supreme Court
considered the question "left open" in Sumitomo. Second,
Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. 122 involved circumstances different from, and FCN Treaty provisions other than,
Article VIII(l) of the U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty, but may nevertheless stand for the proposition that a U.S. subsidiary can invoke the FCN Treaty rights of its parent.
1. Spiess on Remand from the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court remanded Spiess in light of their decision in Sumitomo. On remand the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas considered whether the U.S. subsidiary had standing to invoke its parent's Article VIII(l)
rights. The facts in Spiess were identical to those in the
Sumitomo. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc. ("C. Itoh"), a whollyowned U.S.-incorporated subsidiary of a large Japanese multinational company, was sued under Title VII for exclusively
hiring Japanese males for management level positions.121 C.
Itoh alleged that its Japanese executives were assigned by its
24
parent company in an effort to manage its U.S. subsidiary.
The assignments were allegedly made on a rotating basis so
rights, and the 'impact of the litigation on the third-party interests,' is sufficient to
obtain standing" (citations omitted)); cf. Lewis & Ottley, supra note 98, at 68.
120. See Ishizuka, Note, supra note 98, at 151 n.87; see also Lewis & Ottley, supra
note 98, at 68.
121. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co.725 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting No. 75-H-267
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 1983) (unpublished opinion)), on remand from 457 U.S. 1128
(1982).
122. 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
123. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co.(Am.), 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other
grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
124. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 725 F.2d 970, 972 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting
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that the Japanese executives retained their status as long term
employees of the parent while on temporary assignment to the
United States.' 2 5 The parent, not the subsidiary, determined
26
the salaries as well as the promotions of these executives.'
C. Itoh argued that the presence of its "Japan staff" resulted from its parent's proper exercise of its right "to engage" executive personnel. 2 7 C. Itoh asserted that it had
standing to invoke its parent's rights in defense of the Title VII
claim.' 28 In an unpublished opinion, the Texas district court,
however, precluded C. Itoh from invoking its parent's FCN
Sumitomo nor the
Treaty rights. 129 The court held that neither
30
FCN Treaty would permit this result.
2. The Calnetics Case
Courts have suggested that Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc. '3' may support a U.S. subsidiary's invocation of its
parent's FCN Treaty rights.' 3 2 Calnetics involved a private antitrust action against Volkswagen of America, Inc. ("Volkswagen"), the U.S. subsidiary of Volkswagenwerk, A.G., a West
from Spiess, No. 75-H-267 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 1983) (unpublished opinion)), on remand from 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id. (stating C. Itoh's argument that parent had exercised its "right 'to
engage' managerial and other specialists in this instance" by assigning Japan staff to
U.S. subsidiary).
128. See id. at 972.
129. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 725 F.2d 970, 973 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting
from Spiess, No. 75-H-267 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 1983) (unpublished opinion)), on remand from 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
130. Id.
131. 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
132. See, e.g. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 469 F. Supp. 1, 9 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
(stating that "[r]ead in a light most favorable to [the defendant-U.S. subsidiary],
Calnetics stands for the proposition that a United States incorporated subsidiary of a
foreign corporation has standing to raise the claim that the FCN Treaty rights of its
parent may be affected by court ordered relief"), rev'd on other grounds, 643 F.2d 353
(5th Cir. 1981), vacated on othergrounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982)); Avigliano v. Sumitomo
Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 510-11 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (concurring in statement in Spiess, 469 F. Supp. at 9), aff'don other grounds, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). But see Spiess, 469 F. Supp. at 8 (stating
that "analysis of Calnetics reveals that it does not stand for the proposition that a
United States-incorporated subsidiary of a foreign corporation has, in addition to all
FCN Treaty rights specifically granted it, those FCN Treaty right granted its foreign
parent").
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German corporation. 1 3 The United States District Court for
the Central District of California found that Volkswagen had
violated U.S. antitrust laws. As part of the remedy, the court
enjoined Volkswagen for seven years from importing into the
United States certain German-manufactured automobiles that
were equipped with factory installed air-conditioning, including those automobiles manufactured by Volkswagen's German
parent. 134 In the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
Volkswagen contested the imposition of the import ban by
submitting a memorandum from the Federal Republic of Germany to the U.S. State Department. The memorandum challenged the propriety of the import ban under Article XVI(I) of
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between
the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany ("German Treaty")' 35 and under Article III and Article I(l) of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). 36 The
treaty provisions, according to Volkswagen, prohibited the
United States from discriminating against German automobile
manufacturers. 13 Volkswagen argued that the import ban discriminates against German manufacturers by restricting them
from selling cars with factory-installed air-conditioners in the
United States while imposing no similar restriction on U.S. auIn dictum, 3 9 the Ninth Circuit
tomobile manufacturers.13
agreed with Volkswagen, stating that the district court failed to
consider properly the application of the treaties and the discriminatory effect the import ban would have on German automobile manufacturers. 140 The court's dictum may support a
U.S. subsidiary's ability to invoke its parent's FCN Treaty
133. Calnetics, 532 F.2d at 678 n.3.
134. Id. at 692.
135. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, U.S.-Germany, art. XVI(I), 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1857 [hereinafter German Treaty].
136. Oct. 30, 1947, art. I(l), 111, 61 Stat. A5, AI2, A18, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATr]; Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219, 1221 n.4, 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (reprinting memorandum),
rev'd on other grounds, 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
137, See Calnetics, 532 F.2d at 693; see also Calnetics, 353 F. Supp. 1219.
138. See Calnetics, 532 F.2d at 693.
139. Id. at 691 (stating that "[o]ur resolution of the jury trial issue makes it unnecessary to deal.., with.., challenges to the equitable relief granted by the district
court").
140. Id. at 693-94.
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rights because the court permitted Volkswagen to raise the effect the import ban would have on German manufacturers, including Volkswagen's German parent as aodefense to the antitrust claim. 141

II. THE DECISION IN FORTINO
Fortino v. QuasarCo. 142 is the first case to permit a subsidiary to invoke its parent's rights under an international
treaty. 43 As in Sumitomo and Spiess, the plaintiffs in Fortino alleged that a wholly-owned U.S.-incorporated subsidiary of a
large Japanese multinational company had violated Title VII
by discriminating on the basis of national origin. 144 Upon facts
and arguments virtually identical to those in Sumitomo and
Spiess, speaking through Judge Posner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the U.S. subsidiary can
invoke its Japanese parent's Article VIII(l) rights because,
through its system of assigning executives to its U.S. subsidiary, the parent
had "dictated the subsidiary's discriminatory
45
conduct."1

A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
In Fortino, three former U.S. executives of Quasar Company, a division of Matsushita Electric Corporation of America,
a wholly-owned U.S.-incorporated subsidiary of Matsushita
Electric Industrial Company ("Matsushita") claimed, inter alia,
that Quasar had impermissibly discharged them from their executive positions on the basis of their national origin in viola146
tion of Title VII.

In 1986, Quasar employed ten Japanese executives temporarily assigned by Matsushita to Quasar as part of Matsushita's
assignment system. 14 7 Under the system, these executives
141. Id.
142. 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
143. Even if language in Calnetics supports the parent's invocation of its parent's
FCN treaty rights, the language was merely dictum. See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, 532 F.2d 674, 691 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
144. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 391.
145. Id. at 393.
146. Id. at 391. Because Quasar was a division of the U.S. subsidiary, for all
relevant purposes Quasar was also a wholly-owned subsidiary of Matsushita. See id.
(noting that Quasar is "American subsidiary of a Japanese company").
147. Id. at 392.
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were employees of Quasar and under its day-to-day control,
but they retained their long term status as employees of Matsushita"'4 8 -the executives were designated as Matsushita personnel in Quasar's records, and Matsushita kept their personnel
records.' 4 9 In addition, Matsushita evaluated the executives'
performance, fixed their salaries, and assisted with the relocation of their families to the United States during the period of
their assignment period until they were "rotated" back to Japan.' 5 0 Finally, each Japanese executive entered the United
5
States under an "E" visa.' 1
In 1985, after Quasar suffered operating losses of approxi52
mately US$20 million dollars, Quasar began to reorganize.
Quasar executive Kenichi Nishikawa was in charge of the reorganization. Matsushita sent him to prevent a recurrence of the
loss.' 5 3 As part of the reorganization, Mr. Nishikawa reduced
the work force, including its management, by half.' 54 While
more than half of the non-Japanese executives, including
plaintiffs, were discharged in the reduction in force ("RIF"),
none of the Japanese executives were discharged. 5 5 Indeed,
the Japanese executives received salary increases while the
56
U.S. executives who were not discharged did not.1
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
found that Quasar impermissibly discriminated on the basis of
national origin. 5 7 The court found that even apart from the
RIF, Quasar had paid salaries to their Japanese executives on
an entirely different basis from those of their U.S. executives
because Quasar adjusted its Japanese executives' salaries in accordance with their living quarters, the size of the employees'
148. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1991)
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.

152. Id.; Fortino v. Quasar, 751 F. Supp. 1306, 1309 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd, 950
F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
153. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1991); Fortino, 751 F.
Supp. at 1308. The district court described Nishikawa as one of the executives who
were employees of Quasar and under its day to day control, but who also retained his
long term status as an employee of Matsushita. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1315-16.
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families, and their children's schooling. 151 Moreover, during
the two years prior to Quasar's RIF while Quasar was losing
money "hand over fist," Quasar substantially increased the salary of at least two of its Japanese executives.' 59 The different
salaries, together with the Japanese executives' exemption
from the RIF, formed the basis for the Title VII violation. 6 °
B. Quasar's Right to Assign Defense
Raising the FCN Treaty for the first time on appeal,
Quasar argued a defense based upon its parent's right to assign by referring to Article VII(l) and Article VIII(l) of the
FCN Treaty."'6 Quasar argued that byvirtue of Article VII(l),
Matsushita had the right to manage and control its U.S. subsidiary.' 6 2 Quasar explained that Article VIII(l) gave Matsushita
the right to assign personnel to its U.S. subsidiary to ensure
Matsushita's ability to protect its U.S. investment. 163 Quasar
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Fortino v. Quasar, 751 F. Supp. 1306, 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd 950 F.2d
389, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1991). As an additional basis for the Title VII violation, the
district court also found that Quasar reserved certain of its managerial positions for
Japanese employees and made no attempt to fill these positions with U.S. employees.
Fortino, 751 F. Supp. at 1311, 1315.
161. See generally Brief for Quasar, supra note 4, at 15-22 (arguing that Japanese
executives could be excluded from reduction in force because they were assign by
Matsushita pursuant to FCN Treaty); Reply Brief for Quasar Co. at 3-14, Fortino v.
Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991) (Nos. 91-1123, 91-1197, 91-1564) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Quasar].
In addition to the Article VIII(l) right to assign, Quasar also alluded to the right
to discriminate under Article VIII(I). Brief for Quasar, supra note 4, at 16 (arguing
Article VIII(l) permits discrimination on basis of citizenship). A component of
Quasar's defense was that the district court below had inferred national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII when the discrimination was in fact on the basis
of citizenship. See id. at 22-25; Reply Brief for Quasar, supra, at 18-19.
The Article VIII(1) right to discriminate is an issue separate from the subsidiary's ability to assert its parent's rights because it is necessary first to determine
whether the subsidiary can take advantage of Article VIII(I) before reaching the issue
of whether the FCN Treaty permits citizenship or national origin discrimination.
Even if the discrimination involved was only that of citizenship, if the subsidiary was
not protected by the Article VIII(l), the non-intervened application of Title VII
would result in a violation because Title VII prohibits citizenship discrimination
which has the "purpose or effect" of national origin discrimination. See Espinoza v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
162. Brief for Quasar, supra note 4, at 15; Reply Brief for Quasar, supra note 161,
at 12.
163. Brief for Quasar, supra note 4, at 15-16.
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concluded that, reading the Articles together, the FCN Treaty
gives Japanese companies the right to manage and control U.S.
subsidiaries by assigning executive personnel of their

choice. ' 64
According to Quasar, the issuance of "E" visas to all the
executives demonstrated that the presence of the executives at
Quasar was a result of Matsushita's proper exercise of its FCN
Treaty right to assign. 165 Quasar argued that the INA provisions governing entry into the United States and their implementing State Department regulations governing the issuance
of "E" visas constitute the only mechanism by which Matsushita could exercise its FCN Treaty right to assign personnel to
oversee its U.S. investment. 1 66 Therefore, when the Japanese
executives were issued "E" visas, the State Department expressly recognized that they were sent pursuant to the FCN
6 7
Treaty. 1
According to Quasar, the alleged discriminatory conduct
resulted from Matsushita's "expatriate" system implemented
pursuant to its FCN Treaty right to assign.' l6 Under this rotation system, Matsushita educated and trained the executives,
temporarily assigned them to Quasar, evaluated their performance, maintained their personnel files, and determined their
compensation until their return to Matsushita.' 6 9 The Japanese executives were insulated from the RIF because Matsushita had assigned the executives to work for Quasar pursuant
to the FCN Treaty. 170 Japanese executives were given higher
164. Reply Brief for Quasar, supra note 161, at 12; see also Brief for Quasar, supra
note 4, at 14-15.
165. Brief for Quasar, supra note 4, at 17 (stating that "[tihe U.S. State Department expressly recognized MEI's [Matsushita] treaty right to assign these ten Japanese citizens to these managerial positions at Quasar when it issued the E-I and E-2
visas to them ...

[because] . . . [iun order to qualify for their E-visas, the [Matsushita]

Managers had to occupy executive positions in a company that was formed under the
provisions of the FCN Treaty"). See generally Reply Brief for Quasar, supra note 161,
at 10-14.
166. Reply Brief for Quasar, supra note 161, at 11.
167. Brief for Quasar, supra note 4, at 17-18.
168. Brief for Quasar, supra note 4, at 18 n.3; id. at 15 (arguing that Matsushita
assigned executives pursuant to FCN Treaty thereby justifying exemption from reduction in force); id. at 19-22 (arguing that Matsushita determined Japanese executives' salaries thereby justifying their high salaries).
169. Reply Brief for Quasar, supra note 161, at 4; Brief for Quasar, supra note 4,
at 19-20.
170. Brief for Quasar, supra note 4, at 15.
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salaries because Matsushita evaluated the executives' performances and determined their salaries in accordance with Matsushita procedures, which considered typical "expatriate" factors
including housing, family and educational expenses.' 7 ' According to Quasar, the Article VIII(l) right to assign included
the right to evaluate the executives' performances and determine their salaries because the right to assign "would be an
empty one" if it did not include those other rights. 72 In short,
from Matsushita's exercise of
the Title VII violation resulted
73
its Article VIII(l) rights.

Quasar argued that because it was really the conduct of
Matsushita that caused the alleged discrimination, it would be
unfair to hold Quasar liable under Title VII for Matsushita's
actions and yet deprive Quasar of the opportunity to assert the
Matsushita rights that prompted those actions. 17' As its basis
for asserting Matsushita's right, Quasar argued that it had
third-party standing to raise its parent's Article VIII(l)
rights. 75
C. The Court of Appeals' Holding
Judge Posner, speaking for the Seventh Circuit, permitted
Quasar to invoke Matsushita's FCN Treaty right to assign in
response to the Title VII claim.' 76 Permitting Quasar to raise
the treaty argument for the first time on appeal, 177 the court
171. See id. at 19-22.
172. See id. at 20.
173. Id. at 18 n.3 (stating that "Quasar is being held liable under Title VII for
[Matsushita's] assignment of the ... Managers to Quasar under the FCN treaty").
174. See Reply Brief for Quasar, supra note 161, at 8.
175. Id. at 7-10.
176. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991). It is important to take note of the distinction between the court's discussion of the FCN Treaty
right to assign and its discussion of the FCN Treaty right to discriminate on the basis
of citizenship. See id. at 392-93. The court makes two basic distinct points throughout the opinion. First, Matsushita's assignment of its own executives to its U.S. subsidiary is entirely proper under the FCN Treaty, and no Title VII violation should be
inferred from the parent's proper exercise of that right. See id. at 392, 393. Second,
discrimination on the basis of citizenship is also proper under the FCN Treaty so that
no Title VII violation should be inferred from the parent's proper exercise of the
FCN Treaty right to discriminate on the basis of citizenship. See id. at 391, 392.
Other statements by the court may be interpreted as discussing both the FCN Treaty
right to assign and the FCN Treaty right to discriminate, or a combination of the two
that is a FCN Treaty right to assign on the basis of citizenship. See id. at 392-93.
177. Id. at 391.
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explained that Article VIII(l), authorizing Japanese companies
to engage executive personnel of their choice, confirmed the
propriety of Matsushita's assignments of its own executives to
Quasar. 7 1 Moreover, the issuance of "E" visas to these executives "further confirmed" the propriety of Matsushita's assignment. 79 Because the assignments were proper, the court
opined that the district court should not have found a Title VII
violation.' 0 Conceding the favoritism shown to Quasar's Japanese executives, the court held that discrimination in favor of
executives who were given a "special status" by virtue of a
treaty and its implementing State Department regulations is
not equivalent to discrimination on the basis of national oril8
gin. 1
The court held that because Japanese parent companies
have the right to assign their executives to their subsidiaries,
the proper exercise of that right may not be made the basis for
inferring a Title VII violation.'8 2 According to the court, Title
VII would be taking back from the Japanese with one hand
what the FCN Treaty had given them with the other if the subsidiary could be punished as a result of a proper exercise of its
83
parent's FCN Treaty rights.1
The court next considered whether the subsidiary could
178. Id. at 392. After quoting the text of Article VIII(l), the court stated that
"[tihe propriety of [the parent's] assigning its own executives to [its U.S. subsidiary]
is further confirmed by the issuance of E-1 and E-2 visas to the Japanese expatriate
executives." The court's clear implication is that Article VIII(1) confirms the propriety of the Japanese parent's assignment of its executives to its U.S. subsidiary. Id.; see
also Bias Decision, supra note 9.
179. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392.
180. Id.
181. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1991). Elaborating
on this point, the court next discussed the FCN Treaty right to discriminate rather
than the FCN Treaty right to assign. Id. The court's discussion focused on the fact
that the district court inferred national origin discrimination from a FCN Treaty right
to discriminate on the basis of citizenship. Id.
182. Id. at 393. There are three plausible interpretations of the court's statement that "[t]he exercise of a FCN treaty right may not be made the basis for inferring a violation of Title VII." Id. "That right" may have referred to the parent's
right to assign executives, the parent's right to discriminate on the basis of citizenship, or a combination of the two which would be the parent's right to assign executives on the basis of citizenship. "That right," however, did not refer to the subsidiary's FCN Treaty right to discriminate because, as the court later noted, Sumitomo
"held that an American subsidiary of a foreign parent was not protected by the FCN
Treaty." Id. at 393.
183. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393.
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invoke its parent's Article VIII(I) right to assign in response to
the Title VII claim. 18 4 Noting that the Supreme Court decision
in Sumitomo 185 had "left open" the possibility that the U.S. subsidiary might invoke its parent's FCN Treaty rights, the court
distinguished Sumitomo from Fortino on the basis that, in
Sumitomo, "there was no contention that the parent had dictated the subsidiary's discriminatory conduct."' 18 6 The court
cited one commentator who advocated the three theories of
parent-right invocation. 8 7 The court reasoned that "[a] judgment that forbids Quasar to give preferential treatment to the
expatriate executives that its parent sends would have the same
effect on the parent as if it ran directly against the parent: it
would prevent Matsushita from sending its own executives to
manage Quasar in preference to employing American citizens
in these posts. '"188 The court permitted the subsidiary to invoke its parent's FCN Treaty rights because denying the subsidiary the ability to assert its parent's right to assign would set
the parent's FCN Treaty rights "at naught."' 8 9
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that the district
court erred because the district court, in finding a Title VII
violation, relied upon conduct which resulted from Matsushita's proper assignment of executives to Quasar.' 90 The real
cause of the discrimination, therefore, was not in being nonJapanese, but rather in not being a executive of Matsushita.' 9 1
After declining to decide the extent to which Article VIII(l)
permits discrimination in violation of Title VII,19 2 the court
184. Id.
185. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
186. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991).
187. Id. (citing Ishizuka, Note, supra note 109).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991)
192. See id. The court stated that it "need not choose sides" on whether "the
treaty of friendship in effect confers a blanket immunity from Title VII." Id. This
statement appears to conflict with the court's earlier statement that "[tihe treaty permits discrimination on the basis of citizenship, not of national origin." Id. at 391.
This inconsistency is explained by the fact that there are two sources for the right to
discriminate under the FCN Treaty.
The issue the court declined to decide was the extent of the right to discriminate
by virtue of Article VIII(l)'s "of their choice" provision. The cases the court cited
offer conflicting views with respect to that Article VIII(l) question. See Spiess v. C.
Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that Article VIII(l)'s "of
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dismissed the Title VII claim.' 93
III. FORTINO v. QUASAR CO. UNDERMINES SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT, RELIES ON ERRONEOUS
ASSUMPTIONS, AND PERMITS PARENT-RIGHT
INVOCATION IN VIOLA TION OF THE FCN TREATY,
SUMITOMO AND PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE LA W
Because the subsidiary in Fortino was able to invoke its parent's Article VIII(l) rights to defeat Title VII liability, the Fortino court came to the opposite result from the Sumitomo Court
based upon virtually identical facts and arguments. 9 4 Moreover, in permitting the subsidiary to invoke its parent's Article
VIII(l) rights, the court erroneously assumed that Article
VIII(l) creates the right to assign despite the fact that no such
right exists. 19
Furthermore, the court misidentified the
source of the discriminatory conduct by ignoring the subsidiary's separate corporate existence.19 6 Finally, the court applied a principle of parent-right invocation, which relies on inapposite theories and which violates the FCN Treaty's intent
and the U.S. Supreme Court's Sumitomo decision.' 97 The principle of parent-right invocation defies basic corporate law
which treats separate corporations as distinct entities with discrete substantive rights. 198 The illogical consequences of this
principle demonstrate that parent-right invocation should be
abolished.' 9 9
their choice" provision confers immunity from Title VII), vacated on other grounds, 457
U.S. 1128 (1982); MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1143-47 (3d Cir.
1988) (stating Article VIII(l)'s "of their choice" provision only allows discrimination
based upon citizenship with no conflict with Title VII); Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1185-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that Article VIII(l)
does not inhibit application of Title VII).
However, even apart from Article VIII(1)'s "of their choice" provision, a treaty
right to discriminate on the basis of citizenship may be derived from the FCN
Treaty's general construction which implicitly licenses citizenship discrimination by
defining rights of "nationals" or "companies" "of their Party." See FCN Treaty, supra
note 5, arts. I-XVIII, XX-XXIII, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2066-77, 2078-80.
193. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1991).
194. See infra text accompanying notes 200-15.
195. See infra text accompanying notes 216-47 (discussing forfeiture scheme and
"right to hire" intepretation).
196. See infra text accompanying notes 248-57.
197. See infra text accompanying notes 263-304.
198. See infra text accompanying notes 322-31.
199. See infra text accompanying notes 322-31.
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A. Fortino Was Erroneously Decided
1. Fortino Did Not Correctly Distinguish Sumitomo
In Fortino, the court allowed Quasar to invoke its parent's
Article VIII(l) rights only because it could distinguish the
Sumitomo case. According to the court, "no contention" was
made in Sumitomo that the parent had "dictated the subsidiary's
discriminatory conduct. '2 °° Although the parties' contentions
were not apparent from the Supreme Court's published
Sumitomo opinion, Sumitomo had argued, as Quasar did, that
its parent had dictated its discriminatory conduct.
When the Fortino court stated that Matsushita had dictated
the discriminatory conduct, the court meant that Matsushita
had, through its assignment system, caused the Title VII violation. 20 ' Therefore, when the court stated that the Japanese
parent had "dictated the subsidiary's discriminatory conduct,"
the court meant that Matsushita assigned the executives to
work for Quasar and that Matsushita fixed their salaries in accordance with Matsushita procedures which took into account
their temporary stay in the United States and the temporary
relocation of their families. Matsushita's assignment of the executives to work for Quasar "dictated" Quasar's conduct in exempting the executives from the reduction in force, and Matsushita's determination of their salaries "dictated" Quasar's conduct in paying them on a different basis from their U.S.
employees.
In Sumitomo, the subsidiary also contended that its parent
200. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991).
201. By "dictating the subsidiary's discriminatory conduct," the court did not
simply mean that Matsushita sent and/or ordered Kenichi Nishikawa to implement
the reorganization plan that led to the discriminatory conduct because this would not
explain the discriminatory conduct which occurred prior to Nishikawa's arrival at
Quasar such as the discriminatory payment of salaries and Quasar's reservation of
management positions for Japanese executives. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F.
Supp. 1306, 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd, 950 F. 2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991). The district
court noted that
Quasar accomplished its discrimination by reserving certain of its managerial positions for employees of Japanese national origin, by evaluating and
paying Quasar's managerial employees of Japanese national origin on an
entirely different basis from that used to evaulate and pay Quasar's managerial employees of American national origin, and by exempting all of its managerial employees ofJapanese national origin from Quasar's RIF, all without
lawful justification.
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had dictated its discriminatory conduct. The discriminatory
conduct in Sumitomo involved the hiring of a disproportionate

number of Japanese personnel for management-level positions.2 °2 Although not explicit in the Supreme Court's published opinion, 201 in support of Sumitomo's motion to dismiss
the complaint, Sumitomo alleged by affidavit that "many qualified Japanese nationals have been, and still are, assigned to
Sumitomo by its parent company as 'treaty trader' personnel
to serve in executive and other supervisory, specialist and proo apparent from the published
Also not
fessional positions. "1204 As
opinion were Sumitomo's repeated contentions to the
Supreme Court, by brief and oral argument, that its Japanese
executives were assigned by its parent company.20 5 If the alleged assignments were relevant to the subsidiary's use of Article VIII(l), the Supreme Court would have remanded the case
for that factual determination before denying the subsidiary
Article VIII(l) protection.20 6
As a result, just as Matsushita's assignment of the Japanese

executives to work for Quasar dictated Quasar's conduct in exempting them from the reduction in force, Sumitomo Japan's
assignment of the Japanese executives to work for Sumitomo
dictated Sumitomo's conduct in hiring them. 20 7 Therefore, in
Sumitomo the subsidiary in fact contended that its parent had
dictated its discriminatory conduct. Because the decision in
202. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176, 178 (1982).
203. See id. at 176-89.
204. Affidavit ofJ. Portis Hicks, supra note 52, at 74a.
205. E.g., Brief for Sumitomo, supra note 4, at 8, 14; Oral Argument on Behalf of
Sumitomo, supra note 6, at 26-27 (arguing that decision at issue is Japanese company's decision to send people to United States).
206. E.g., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 683, 694 (1992) (conditioning resolution of issue
in case on remand and factual findings by district court); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 354 (1976) (same); Laduer v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178-79 (1958)
(same)p; see FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 52(a) (stating that findings of facts are to be made by
district court). The Supreme Court should also have remanded the case to determine the "E" visa status of Sumitomo's Japanese executives if such status had been
relevant to Article VIII(l) protection.
207. In fact, where the assignment dictates the subsidiary's act of hiring executives there is a stronger "dictation" at work than where the assignment dictates the
subsidiary's act of exempting them from a reduction in force, because the subsidiary's act of hiring is an immediate effect of the parent's act of assigning or sending
the executives, whereas the subsidiary's act of exempting them from a reduction in
force does not necessarily follow from the parent's act of assignment.
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Fortino relies on the absence of any contention in Sumitomo that
the parent had dictated the subsidiary's discriminatory conduct
the court failed to properly distinguish the Sumitomo case.
2. Fortino Failed to Acknowledge the Supreme Court's
Rejection of the Right to Assign Defense
In addition to failing to acknowledge the subsidiary's contentions in Sumitomo, the Seventh Circuit also failed to acknowledge the Supreme Court's rejection of the defense based upon
the threatened derogation of the parent's alleged right to assign. The Seventh Circuit gave the subsidiary Article VIII(l)
protection on the same rationale which the Supreme Court had
rejected.
Sumitomo's rationale for Article VIII(l) protection was
based upon the parent's FCN Treaty right to control and manage its U.S. subsidiary by engaging Japanese executives and
the fact that deprivation of Article VIII(l) protection would severely undercut its parent's treaty rights.2 0 8 The Second Circuit agreed with Sumitomo. Finding it unlikely that the FCN
Treaty would give Japanese companies the right to manage its
U.S. subsidiaries and yet bar those same subsidiaries from invoking treaty protection, the court permitted the subsidiary to
invoke Article VIII(l) as a "company of Japan.12 °9 With regard to this right to assign defense, however, the Supreme
Court reversed the Second Circuit and precluded the U.S. sub2 10
sidiary's use of Article VIII(1).
The Supreme Court likely realized that the subsidiary's
use of Article VIII(I) alone would not prevent the alleged derogation of the parent's treaty rights because any Title VII judgment against the subsidiary, not just those due to the denial of
Article VIII(l) protection, would equally undercut the parent's
treaty rights.2 1 ' What was actually required, therefore, to pre208. See supra notes 56-72 and accompanying text (discussing Sumitomo's right
to assign defense).
209. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's
decision).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 84-97 (discussing Supreme Court's holding).
211. For example, the alleged derogation of the parent's rights would take place
if the application of Article VIII(l) did not ultimately protect the subsidiary from the
Title VII claim. See, e.g., Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir.

1166 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL 14 WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:1130
vent the alleged derogation was not merely the invocation of
Article VIII(1), but complete exemption from the Title VII
claims. The Court was apparently not prepared to allow the
collateral effect on the Japanese parent to justify complete exemption for Sumtiomo, a U.S. company, from enforcement of
U.S. anti-discrimination laws.
The Seventh Circuit permitted the subsidiary's use of Article VIII(l) because a judgment
against the subsidiary purportedly would prevent the parent
from sending its own executives to manage its U.S. subsidiary. 2 " Holding otherwise would, according to the court, set
the parent's treaty rights "at naught" or, in other words, would
cause the derogation of the parent's treaty rights. 1 4 In short,
the Supreme Court heard and rejected virtually the identical
arguments which the Seventh Circuit subsequently adopted in
permitting Article VIII(l) protection.2 1 5
3. Article VIII(l) Permits Japanese Companies to Place
Executives "Of Their Choice" Only in Their U.S.
Branches
a. Sumitomo Endorses an "Entity" Law Interpretation of
Article VIII(l): The "Forfeiture" Scheme
The Second Circuit, by permitting the Japanese parent to

ignore the corporate form of its U.S. subsidiary, endorsed a
1981) (permitting subsidiary to invoke Article VIII(I) without allowing exemption
from Title VII), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
212. Assuming that liability of the subsidiary does in fact set the parent's treaty
rights "at naught," not only would the imposition of Title VII liability undercut its
parent's treaty rights, but so would any unfavorable civil or criminal remedy which,
due to the nature of the sanction, would in any way restrict the subsidiary's autonomy
in its employment practices. If infringement on the parent's right to assign was an
acceptable basis for exempting U.S. companies from certain U.S. laws, the U.S. subsidiary would be completely exempt from U.S. age discrimination laws, child labor
laws (if the parent wanted to assign child specialists), and all other employment discrimination laws because such employment regulations restrict the parent's freedom
to assign. See generally Schlei & Grossman, supra note 102 (discussing U.S. employment discrimination laws).
213. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991).
214. Id.
215. Only the method of invoking Article VIII(l) differed between Sumitomo and
Fortino-the "company ofJapan" method versus the parent-right invocation method.
Although the methods differed, the rationale for both methods was the same-the
threatened derogation of the parent's FCN Treaty rights by denial of Article VIII(I)
protection. This rationale, however, did not persuade the Supreme Court to permit
the subsidiary's use of Article VIII(l).
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"piercing the corporate veil" or "enterprise" interpretation of
the FCN Treaty. 1 6 Consistent with enterprise theory, the Second Circuit also held that the definitional section of the FCN
Treaty, which defined the nationality of corporations by their
place of incorporation, merely conferred legal status on the
enterprise but did not govern its substantive rights under the
FCN Treaty. 21 7 Because the legal status of enterprises was insignificant for determining substantive rights, the Second Circuit did not believe that a Japanese company would forfeit its
Article VIII(l) right to staff its U.S. enterprise by operating
through a U.S. subsidiary rather than a U.S. branch. 1
By reversing the Second Circuit on the issue, the Supreme
Court implicitly rejected the "piercing the corporate veil" and
"enterprise" interpretation of the FCN Treaty and endorsed a
traditional corporate "entity law" interpretation, thereby forcing Japanese companies to acknowledge their subsidiaries' corporate forms.2 1 9 The Court reinforced an entity law interpre216. See Herman Walker, Treatiesfor the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. CoMP. L. 229, 233 n.l 1 (1956); supra
notes 78-81 and accompanying text (reporting portion of opinion). See generally
BLUMBERG, supra note 36, §§ 1.01-1.03.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83 (reporting portion of opinion).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83 (reporting portion of opinion).
The Second Circuit was responding to the opinion by the district court first stated
which believed that a Japanese company would forfeit its identity by operating as a
U.S. subsidiary. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 510
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (concurring with decision in United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152
F. Supp. 818, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1957), and stating that Japanese company surrendered
its Japanese identity with respect to activities of its U.S. subsidiary, the Japanese identity otherwise giving company Article VIII(I) rights, by operating through U.S. subsidiary), aft'don other grounds, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacatedon other grounds, 457
U.S. 176 (1982).
219. See, e.g., Avigliano, 473 F. Supp. at 510 (concurring in decision in R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. at 823); see also Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353, 369
(5th Cir. 1981) (Reavley,J., dissenting), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
A combination of letters from the U.S. Department of State to the EEOC interpreting Article VIII(1) also suggests that Japanese companies may not ignore the
legal form of their U.S. investment. A 1978 letter answered a number of questions.
Letter from Lee R. Marks, State Department Deputy Legal Advisor, to Abner W.
Sibal, General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, dated October 17, 1978, Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at 94a. In answering the first question,
the State Department advisor stated that Article VIII(1) permits Japanese companies
to fill executive positions within their U.S. enterprises withJapanese nationals admitted as "E" visa treaty traders. Id. at 95a. The second question asked whether "the
situation is different if the company doing business in the United States is not incorporated in the United States" Id. The advisor answered in the negative. Id. at 96a.
However, in a subsequent letter, the State Department reneged on the answer to
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tation by holding a company's juridical form to be the sole factor in determining the applicability of Article VIII(I). 220 The
Court held that the definitional section of the FCN treaty defined both the legal status of enterprises and their substantive
rights. 22 ' As an application of traditional corporate entity theory, under the "forfeiture" interpretation of the FCN Treaty,
Japanese companies forfeit their Article VIII(l) rights by operating through a U.S. subsidiary.2 2 2 Only Japanese companies
choosing to operate through U.S. branches retain their Article
2 23
VIII( 1) rights.
Consistent with this forfeiture scheme, if we assume that
Article VIII(l) contains a right to assign executives "of their
choice," then Japanese companies would forfeit that right
when operating through a U.S. subsidiary.2 24 Therefore, Japanese companies could only assign executives "of their choice"
to their U.S. branches. 2 5 To put it another way, when Japaquestion two, stating that U.S.-incorporated subsidiaries were not covered by Article
VIII(l). Letter from James R. Atwood, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of
State, to Lutz Alexander Prager, Assistant General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, dated Sept. 11, 1979, Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at 307a;
see Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 n.10 (1982). These
letters interpret the FCN Treaty as precluding Japanese companies from ignoring the
corporate form of their U.S. subsidiaries.
220. See generally BLUMBERG, supra note 32, at Preface (discussing entity law and
enterprise law). The place-of-incorporation test for determining the citizenship of
corporations is consistent with the traditional rules of corporate law that treats corporations and entities distinct from their shareholders. See Avigliano, 473 F. Supp. at
509.
221. See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
222. See Spiess, 643 F.2d at 369 (Reavley,J., dissenting) (stating that ifJapanese
company chooses to cross bright line between two forms of business association in
order to gain all benefits of our legal system, it is reasonable that they accept legal
consequences); Avigliano, 473 F. Supp. at 510 (agreeing with decision in R.P. Oldham
Co., 152 F. Supp. at 823, and stating that Japanese company surrendered its Japanese
identity with respect to activities of its U.S. subsidiary, Japanese identity otherwise
giving company Article VIII(l) rights, by operating through U.S. subsidiary).
223. See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 182 (stating that "[c]learly, Article VIII(l) only
applies to companies of one of the treaty countries operating in the other country").
224. See, e.g., Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 369, vacated on other grounds,
457 U.S. 1128 (1982) (Reavley, J., dissenting); Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am.,
Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (agreeing with decision in United States
v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1957)), aff'don other grounds,
638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
225. See, e.g., Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 751 F. Supp. 1548, 1552, 156263 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (permitting Article VIII(l)'s license to discriminate on basis of
citizenship pursuant to "of their choice" provision to apply to assignments made by
head office in Japan to U.S. branch).
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nese companies assign executives to manage their U.S. subsidiaries, the
assignment is not made pursuant to Article
2 26

VIII(I),
and Article VIII(1)'s "of their choice" provision,
which may permit discrimination in violation of Title VII, 2 2

would never attach. Under the forfeiture scheme, only an assignment made from a Japanese company to a U.S. branch
would be entitled to Article VIII(l) protection.228
The practical significance of the Article VIII(l) forfeiture
is to force a Japanese company to acknowledge the form of its
U.S. investment by limiting the number of executives a Japanese company can assign to its U.S. subsidiary. Japanese companies that retain their Article VIII(l) right to assign executives "of their choice" can place a large number of Japanese
executives in their U.S. branches depending on the extent of
permissible discretion under the "of their choice" provision. 22 9
On the other hand, a Japanese company which has forfeited its
Article VIII(l) rights by incorporating a U.S. subsidiary could
only place a limited number of key executives to manage its
U.S. enterprise. The actual number of permissible executives
would be reflected by the subsidiary's need to employ such executives, and the legal medium allowing their employment
would be the traditional Title VII defenses. 2

0

The Japanese

226. Even without Article VIII(l) protection, Japanese companies may still assign executives and the executives may enter and remain in the United States if the
executives satisfy the requirements for the issuance of E-visas. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.51
(1991) (stating requirements).
227. See, e.g., Spiess, 643 F.2d 353 (holding that Article VIII(l) provides blanket
immunity from Title VII claims). In addition, because the assignment is not made
pursuant to any treaty right, the FCN Treaty right to discriminate on the basis of
citizenship, derived from the general construction of the FCN Treaty, also does not
attach. E.g., Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991) (permitting discrimination on basis of citizenship otherwise violating Title VII because it has effect of
discrimination on basis of national origin because of FCN Treaty right to discriminate on basis of citizenship derived from general construction of FCN Treaty); see
supra note 192 (discussing right to discriminate on basis of citizenship apart from
Article VIII(l)'s "of their choice" provision).
228. See, e.g., Adames, 751 F. Supp. at 1552, 1562-63 (permitting Article VIII(l)'s
license to discriminate on basis of citizenship pursuant to "of their choice" provision
to apply to assignments made by head office in Japan to U.S. branch); cf. MacNamara
v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988); Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745
F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
229. See supra note 40 (dicussing conflict in circuits over extent of right to discriminate under Article VIII(l)'s "of their choice" provision).
230. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176, 189 n.19 (1982)
(stating with regard to Title VII defenses that "[tihere can be little doubt that some

1170 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:1130
company's forfeiture of its FCN treaty rights is just, given the
company's voluntary choice to gain the advantages of establishing a U.S. subsidiary rather than a U.S. branch, including
limited liability and immunity from U.S. courts' exercise of jurisdiction.2 3 '
b. Article VIII(l) Creates No Right to Assign or Send, But
Only the Right to Hire, Employ, or Use Japanese
Executives for Their Branches "Within the
Territories of the United States"
Although the forfeiture interpretation would serve Article
VIII(l)'s purpose of forcing Japanese companies to acknowledge the form of their U.S. investment by giving the companies the right to place executives "of their choice" only in their
U.S. branches, a more accurate interpretation of Article
VIII(l), which has the same effect as the forfeiture scheme, denies the existence of a right to assign. Because a non-U.S.
company and its U.S. branch are the same company, an Article
VIII(l) right permitting Japanese companies to hire, employ or
use executives "of their choice" would be sufficient to give the
companies the right to place such executives in their U.S.
branches.2 3 2 On the other hand, because non-U.S. companies
and their U.S. subsidiaries are separate and distinct entities, an
Article VIII(l) right to hire, employ or use executives "of their
choice" would not give Japanese companies the right to place
such executives in their U.S. subsidiaries. 3 3 In order forJapapositions in a Japanese controlled company doing business in the United States call
for great familiarity with not only the language of Japan, but also the culture, customs, and business practices of that country").
231. See Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 369 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on
other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982) (Reavley, J., dissenting); Avigliano v. Sumitomo
Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'don other grounds 638 F.2d
552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); United States v. R.P.
Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
232. See Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 751 F. Supp. 1548, 1563 (E.D.N.Y.
1990) (stating that "the treaty allows the Uapanese company] to employ managers in
its New York branch office on the basis of their Japanese citizenship"); MacNamara,
863 F.2d 1135; Wickes, 745 F.2d 363; cf. Couillard v. Bank of New Mexico, 548 P.2d
459, 463 (N.M. 1976) (holding that "employees of the branch are employees of the
parent bank [because] [t]he action or inaction of the branch bank is the action or
inaction of the parent bank").
233. See e.g., Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 469 F. Supp. 1, 8 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
(stating that right of Japanese parent to hire executives of their choice would not
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nese companies to place executives "of their choice" in U.S.
subsidiaries, the companies need a right to send or assign such
executives.23 4 However, Article VIII(l) does not contain a
right to assign or send. Rather, the Article VIII(l) right "to
engage" executive personnel is the right of Japanese companies to "hire," "employ," or "use" within the territories of the
United States executive personnel of their choice. Overwhelming judicial and legislative support exists for the proposition that "to engage" means to hire, employ, or use, not to
assign or send. 3 5 Moreover, by the English definition, "to engage" means "to obtain or contract for the services of: employ."' 23 6 Furthermore, the Japanese term in the Japanese verprotect hiring practices of subsidiary), rev'd, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on
other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
234. E.g., Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1991).
235. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 5, 82.d Cong., 1st Sess. at 3-4 (1953) (explaining that
Article VIII(l) "states that companies doing business in the territory of the other
party may hire" executive personnel of their choice), reprinted in part in Brief of C.
Itoh as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 24; Letter from Lee R. Marks, State Department
Deputy Legal Advisor, to Abner W. Sibal, General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, dated October 17, 1978, Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at
94a-95a (stating that "Article VIII(l) of the [U.S.-Japan] Treaty gives nationals and
companies of each Party the right to employ, in the territory of the other, executive
personnel ... of their choice. This provision was intended to ensure that U.S. companies operating in the Japan could hire U.S. personnel for critical positions"); Testimony of Senator Hickenlooper, Testimony before the Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations at 45, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., on Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation with Colombia, Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, and Germany (May 9, 1952) (stating that Article VIII(1) attempts to permit "the nationals of
either party to use their own technical and professional experts within the territory of
the other"); Diplomatic Note from United States High Commissioner for Germany to
the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dec. 15, 1957), reprintedin Joint Appendix, supra note 52, at 255a (stating that under Article VIII(l) of U.S.-Germany
FCN Treaty, the right to engage is right "to have the services of"); cf. Lemnitzer v.
Philippine Air Lines, 783 F. Supp. 1238, 1242-44 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that Article VIII(1) of Air Transport Agreement between United States and Republic of Philippines providing that airlines of one Party are permitted to "bring in and maintain"
in the territory of the other Party certain managerial and skilled personnel was intended to be analogous to and function the same as FCN Treaties); MacNamara v.
Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1140 (3rd Cir. 1988) (to hire and discharge); Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 558 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated on other
grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir.
1981) (to hire), rev'd on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982); Adames v. Mitsubishi
Bank, Ltd., 751 F. Supp. 1548, 1563 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (employ); Wickes v. Olympic
Airways, 745 F.2d 363, 368-69 (6th Cir. 1984) (to hire); Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1185 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (to hire).
236. See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1141 (quoting WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE
UNIVERSrrY DICTIONARY 433 (1984) and holding that Article VIII(l)'s right "to en-
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sion of the FCN Treaty which is the counterpart to the word
"engage" in the English version means to "use" or "make use
23 7

of."

The only court to consider this issue was the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas in Spiess.2 38 Before
the case reached the Supreme Court, C. Itoh attempted to
avoid Title VII liability by invoking its parent's alleged right to
"staff" its U.S. subsidiary with executive personnel "of its
choice." '2 39 In response to the subsidiary's "right to staff" argument, the district court held that Article VIII(l) creates no
right to staff but only the right to hire.24 ° Therefore, invoking
its parent's Article VIII(l) rights would only protect its parent's own act of hiring and would not shield the subsidiary's
independent hiring practices. 2 4 '
In Fortino, the court suggested that the issuance of "E"
visas to the subsidiary's executives supported the parent's exercise of its right to assign.2 4 2 However, nothing in the INA or
its implementing State Department regulations governing the

issuance "E" visas requires that an applicant be an employee
of, or be assigned by, a Japanese company.2 4 3 Rather than
gage" includes right to fire); see also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 528 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining "[e]ngage" as, among other things, "[t]o employ").
237. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.Japan, art. VIII(l), 4 U.S.T. 2085, 2097 (Japanese version); KENNETH G. HENSHALL, A
GUIDE TO REMEMBERING JAPANESE CHARACTERS 60 (2d ed. 1989) (defining symbol
mochiiru as "use"); KENKYuSHA'S LIGHTHOUSE JAPANESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1611

(1984) (defining symbol as "use" or "make use of"); Vienna Convention of the Law
of Treaties, openedfor signature May 23, 1969, art. 33(1), 25 I.L.M. 543, 564 (1986)
(stating that "[w]hen a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the
text is equally authoritative in each language").
238. 469 F. Supp 1 (S.D. Tex. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.
1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
239. Id. at 8.
240. Id.
241. Id. Under the Spiess holding, a U.S. branch would be protected by the Japanese parent's right to hire because the parent's act of hiring is also the branch's act of
hiring. Cf. Couillard v. Bank of New Mexico, 548 P.2d 459, 463 (N.M. 1976) (holding that "employees of the branch are employees of the parent bank [because] [t]he
action or inaction of the branch bank is the action or inaction of the parent bank").
242. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that
the "E" visa status ofJapanese executives further confirmed the parent's propriety in
assigning the executives).
243. See 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)(E) (1988) (amended 1991); 22 C.F.R. § 41.51
(1991). The only visa which would require an applicant to previously be employed
by a Japanese company immediately prior to entry is the L- 1 "intra-company trans-
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demonstrating the exercise of a right to assign, the "E" visa
status of an executive demonstrates only proper entry into and
employment in the United States. 44
As a result, a careful reading of Article VIII(l) provides
that "companies of [Japan] ... shall be permitted to [hire, employ, or use], within the territories of the [United States], ....
executive personnel . . . of their choice. ' 245 In light of
Sumitomo's entity law interpretation of Article VIII(l), the only
time a company of Japan could be "within the territories of the
United States" in order to hire, employ or use executives of its
choice is when the Japanese company operates through a U.S.
branch. Under Sumitomo, only a Japanese company operating
through a U.S. branch can assert Article VIII(l)'s right to hire,
employ or use executive personnel of their choice in response
to a Title VII claim.246 Consequently, when Japanese companies assign executives to their U.S. subsidiaries, the assignments are not made pursuant to Article VIII(1)'s right to hire,
feree" visa. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(L) (1988) (amended 1991); 22 C.F.R. § 41.54

(1991).
Whatever the connection between Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty and the
issuance of "E" visas may be, it is no more or less than the connection between
Article VIII(l) and the issuance of "L"-i, "H"-I visas, each of which require that the
visa applicant perform executive or otherwise skilled duties. See 8 U.S.C.
§ I101(a)(15)(H), (L) (1988) (amended 1991); 22 C.F.R. § 41.54 (1991). Indeed, the
INA section for the issuance of "E" visa's reference to the FCN Treaty refers not to
Article VIII(l), but rather to Article I(l) of the FCN Treaty. Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ I 101(a)(15)(E) (1988) (amended 1991) with FCN Treaty, supra note 5, art. I(l), at
2066.
244. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 513 n.14
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that "[t]he State Department guidelines are promulgated for
the purpose of determining an individual's immigration status"), aff'd on other grounds,
638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacatedon other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); State Dept.
telegram No. 089624 to Japanese Posts 3,9, reprinted in Brief of United States as
Amicus Curiae, Appendix A, at 2a, 6a-7a, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457
U.S. 176 (1982) (Nos. 80-2070, 81-24) (describing requirement that applicant is
"destined" for proper position); 22 C.F.R. § 41.51 (1991).
245. FCN Treaty, supra note 5, art. VIII(l), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070.
246. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176, 182 (stating that
"[c]learly, Article VIII(l) only applies to companies of one of the treaty countries
operating in the other country"); e.g., Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 751 F. Supp.
1548, 1562-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (permitting Japanese company operating through
branch to invoke Article VIII(I) right to hire). See generally Gerald D. Silver, Note,
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties and United States Discrimination Law: The
Right of Branches of Foreign Companies to Hire Executives "Of Their Choice," 57 FORDHAM L.
REV. 765 (1989) (discussing application of Article VIII(l) to non-U.S. companies operating through U.S. branches).
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employ or use and therefore are not protected by Article
VIII(1)'s "of their choice" provision. The practical import of
the "right to hire" interpretation of Article VIII(l) is the same
as that under the forfeiture scheme-it forces Japanese companies to acknowledge the corporate form of their U.S. investment by limiting the number of Japanese executives the company can place in their U.S. subsidiaries.2 4 7
4. Fortino Failed to Acknowledge the True Nature of the
Discriminatory Conduct
In reversing the district court on the Title VII claim, the
Fortino court relied primarily on the notion that the parent's
proper exercise of its FCN Treaty rights was the basis for the
Title VII violation. 248 The court opined that the Title VII violation resulted from Matsushita's assignment of the executives
to Quasar and Matsushita's determination of their salaries.
The court's premise is erroneous because it ignores the subsidiary's separate corporate existence.
As previously noted, a wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary is a
separate legal entity from its parent.24 9 As a distinct corporate
''person," the subsidiary always acts as an independent entity,
taking full responsibility for its actions. 250 Therefore, regardless of whether the parent had the right to assign the executives employed by the subsidiary, the subsidiary's own actions
are those which are subject to scrutiny.2 5 '
247. See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189 n. 19 (stating with regards to defenses to Title
VII claims that "[t]here can be little doubt that some positions in a Japanese controlled company doing business in the United States call for great familiarity with not
only the language of Japan, but also the culture, customs, and business practices of
that country").
248. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that
"[t]he exercise of a treaty right may not be made the basis for inferring a violation of
Title VII").
249. See supra text accompanying note 32.
250. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (4
Wheat. 1819) (stating that "[a]mong the most important [properties of corporations]
are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality: properties, by
which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may
act as a single individual"); HARRY G. HENN &JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS §§ 79-80 (3d ed. 1983) (describing corporation as independent "person"
which acts as natural persons do); e.g., Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal

Law: Deterrance, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141 (1982) (discussing corporation's criminal responsibility).

251. See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176, 179 (1982)
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Applying this basic corporate principle to Fortino, the actual basis for the Title VII violation was Quasar's independent
actions, not those of Matsushita. The discriminatory conduct
was not Matsushita's assignment of its executives to Quasar,
but Quasar's independent acts of not only hiring all the executives whom the parent wished to assign but also exempting
them from the RIF.252 The discriminatory conduct was not
Matsushita's fixing the Japanese executives' salaries, but
Quasar's independent act of paying salaries on a discriminatory basis.253
When a subsidiary is sued because of the employment of
Japanese executives assigned by a Japanese parent, the subsidiary discriminates by the implementation of an in-house policy
to hire and employ anyone the parent wishes to assign. 254 This
facially neutral in-house policy may have a discriminatory impact if, for example, the parent assigns only Japanese executives to its U.S. subsidiary.255 If the neutral hiring practice has
(describing employment practices as "[the subsidiary's] employment practices" despite arguments in Brief that parent had exercised its employment practices pursuant
to right to engage executives in U.S. subsidiary); Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am.,
Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 510-11 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (concurring in opinion in Spiess
v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 469 F. Supp. 1, 8 (S.D. Tex. 1979) that despite U.S. subsidiary's contention that its Japanese parent had right to staff U.S. subsidiary by sending
Japanese executives employment practices at issue are subsidiary's "own employment practices," not those of parent), rev'd on other grounds, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.
1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982)).
252. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306, 1315 (N.D. I11.1990) (reciting bases for Title VII violation including Quasar's reserving positions for Japanese
executives and excluding them from the RIF), rev'd 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
253. See id.
254. E.g., Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 103 F.R.D. 562, 579 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (describing Sumitomo's contention that its hiring practices were dictated by its
Japanese parent), on remandfrom 457 U.S. 176 (1982); Telephone Interview with Professor Tsurumi, supra note 31 (stating that U.S. subsidiaries hire all expatriates parent
assigns). In Avigliano, the U.S. subsidiary, Sumitomo, was asked by interrogatory
whether it utilized any selection criteria by which it determined whom it hired or
promoted. Avigliano, 103 F.R.D. at 579. In reply, Sumitomo stated that "the determination of whom would be employed in [executive, managerial and/or sales] positions was made by [Sumitomo's] parent ... in Japan." Id.
255. Telephone Interview with Professor Tsurumi, supra note 31 (stating that
rotating "expatriate" executives in U.S. subsidiaries are all Japanese because they are
sent from Japan); see, e.g., Avigliano, 103 F.R.D. at 569 (reporting that between 40%
and 45% of entire staff, managerial and non-managerial, of U.S. subsidiary was comprised of "rotating staff" exclusively Japanese executives assigned from Japan during
at least 1974-77); EEOC Decision No. 86-2, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1879
(Nov. 22, 1985) (stating thatJapanese company assigned rotational executives to U.S.
subsidiary, all of rotational employees being Japanese males).
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such an effect, the subsidiary must solve the problem either by
hiring more non-Japanese executives, or by declining to hire
all of the executives whom its parent wishes to assign. 5 6
The Fortino court justified Matsushita's determination of
the salaries of the Quasar's executives in part because the executives retained their long-term status as employees of Matsushita.2 5 7 However, Quasar should have paid salaries to its executives on a non-discriminatory basis regardless of whether
its Japanese executives had second jobs with Matsushita. If
Matsushita wanted to compensate the executives for relocating
their families while on temporary assignment to the United
States, then Matsushita should have paid them additional salaries from Matsushita's own Japanese-earned revenues. However, the salaries that the Japanese executives received from
Quasar were revenues generated by a U.S. company. Therefore, the salaries from Quasar's revenues should have been
paid on a non-discriminatory basis.
Contrary to the Seventh Circuit's opinion, the Title VII
violation was based upon Quasar's own conduct, not upon the
parent's exercise of its FCN Treaty rights. As an application of
basic corporate law, a parent's exercise of a treaty right does
not excuse the subsidiary's own discriminatory hiring, firing
and salary functions. Accordingly, Matsushita's rotation program does not excuse Quasar's Title VII violation.
5. The Seventh Circuit's Assumption Regarding the "E"
Visa Status of Quasar's Executives Is Erroneous
In Fortino, the court also assumed that discrimination in
favor ofJapanese executives who were given a special "E" visa
status by virtue of the FCN Treaty and its implementing regulations does not amount to a violation of Title VII.2 58 However, discrimination in favor ofJapanese executives violates Ti256. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. 1992) (codifying disparate impact discrimination); Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971); see supra note 3.
257. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that
assigned executives retain their status as employees of parent).
258. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that
"discrimination in favor of foreign executives given a special status by virtue of a
treaty and its implementing regulations is not equivalent to discrimination on the
basis of national origin").
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tie VII regardless of their "E" visa status.259 When reviewing
visa requests, the State Department does so on an individual
basis only and does not study the employment practices of the
individual's prospective U.S. employer. 2 6 0 Therefore, the

State Department's processing of visa applicants is not a substitute for Title VII enforcement procedures2 6 ' and the "E"
visa status of a company's employees does not exempt the
company itself from Title VII review. In short, an "E" visa
holder can not act as a "portable conduit" of rights flowing to
262
the companies of his or her employment.
B. None of the Three Theories of Parent-RightInvocation Support
the Court's Decision in Fortino
In holding that U.S. subsidiaries can invoke their parent's
Article VIII(l) rights, the Fortino opinion did not clearly articulate the theory of parent-right invocation on which the court
relied. 6 3 The court only cited, as its single supporting source,
one commentator who advocates the three theories of parentright invocation. 2 ' However, none of the theories of parentright invocation supports the Seventh Circuit's decision in Fortino. Moreover, each theory of parent-right invocation relies
upon inapposite theories.
1. Third-Party Standing Does Not Support Quasar's Right to
Invoke Matsushita's Article VIII(I) Rights
In permitting the subsidiary to assert its parent's rights,
the Seventh Circuit most likely relied upon third-party standing theory of parent-right invocation. The court permitted
Quasar to assert Matsushita's FCN Treaty rights because pre259. See Brief for Avigliano at 28-30, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457
U.S. 176 (1982) (Nos. 80-2070, 81-24); see supra note 3 (noting that discrimination
in favor of Japanese executives violates Title VII).
260. See Letter of Lee R. Marks, State Department Deputy Legal Advisor, to Abner W. Sibal, General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, dated
October 17, 1978, reprintedin Joint Appendix to Briefs, supra note 52, at 96a; Brief for
Avigliano, supra note 259, at 29.
261. Brief for Avigliano, supra note 259, at 28.
262. See Brief of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae at
8, Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991) (Nos. 91-1123, 91-1197, 91-

1564).
263. See Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393.
264. See id. at 393. The court cited only the authority contained in Ishizuka,
Note, supra note 98.
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cluding Quasar from doing so would prevent Matsushita from
sending executives to manage Quasar.2 6 5 In other words, Matsushita's right to manage Quasar would have been materially
impaired if Quasar could not invoke its parent's FCN Treaty
rights.
Even assuming that third-party standing theory of parentright invocation is correct in stating that impairment of the
third party's interests is sufficient to obtain third-party standing, 266 the theory still fails to support the Seventh Circuit's
conclusion in Fortino because a judgment which forbids the
subsidiary from invoking Article VIII(l) does not necessarily
prevent Japanese companies from sending their own executives to manage their U.S. subsidiaries.2 6 7 Japanese companies
have continued to use rotation programs since 1982 when the
Supreme Court took Article VIII(l) away from U.S. subsidiaries. 6 8 Moreover, Japanese companies have been successful in
265. See Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393 (stating that "[a] judgement that forbids Quasar
to give preferential treatment to the expatriate executives that its parent sends ...
would prevent Matsushita from sending its own executives to manage Quasar").
266. According to third-party standing theory of parent-right invocation, the impairment of the third party's rights is the only element required for a subsidiary to
invoke its parent's FCN treaty rights. See Ishizuka, Note, supra note 98, at 151 n.87
(stating that "[t]he Supreme Court has stated that evidence of indirect impairment of
third parties' constitutional rights ... and the 'impact of the litigation on the thirdparty interests ... is sufficient to obtain standing" (citations omitted)); see supra text
accompanying notes 114-20 (discussiong third-party standing theory of parent-right
invocation).
267. See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text (citing sources).
268. Telephone Interview with Professor Tsurumi, supra note 38 (stating that
Japanese companies have continued to rotate "expatriate" executives over the past
ten years and that the decision in Sumitomo "does not necessarily prevent rotating
expatriates to [U.S.] subsidiaries"); e.g., Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389(7th Cir.
1991) (reporting assignment of Japanese executives); U.S. Workers Tell House Subcommittee of Discrimination by Japanese-Owned Firms, 154 Daily Lab. Rep. A- 1 (August 9,
1991) (reporting statement by U.S. executive of U.S. subsidiary ofJapanese company
that subsidiary is used as a "rotating ground" for executives of parent). Numerous
discrimination charges against Japanese-owned subsidiaries in the United States
prompted a study done by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission onjapanese-owned companies. See CongressionalTestimony by EEOC Chairmanand OFCCPDeputy Director on Discrimination by Japanese-Owned Companies, 142 Daily Lab. Rep. D-1
(1991) [hereinafter EEOC Study]. The study reported the continued existence ofJapanese executives in management level positions in the subsidiaries. See id. In the
study, the EEOC reported that with respect to officials and managers, the employment participation of Asians or Pacific Islanders was significantly higher in Japaneseowned companies during the 1980's. Id. In 1989, for instance, it was 22.7 percent in
such companies, compared to 2.1 percent in other foreign-owned companies and 1.8
percent in all companies. Id. Most, if not all, the Asian executives of these Japanese-
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managing their subsidiaries since that time.2 6 9
However, contrary to the parent-right invocation theory,
material impairment of the third party's rights alone is insufficient for third-party standing.2 70 Absent a special relationship
between the litigant and the third party, 2 7 1 third-party standing
requires that the third party be sufficiently unable to assert his
or her own rights.2 7 2 However, when a U.S. subsidiary seeks to
owned companies are Japanese executives on expatriate programs. Telephone Interview with Professor Tsurumi, supra note 31.
Japanese companies have continued their rotation programs through their subsidiaries despite the subsidiaries' assumption that Article VIII(1) was not available to
them. See Interview with Lewis M. Steel, supra note 97 (expressing his surprise over
the Fortino decision because lawyers have looked at the problem of whether Article
VIII(1) was available to subsidiaries since the Sumitomo decision and "had gotten nowhere"). Indeed, the Sumitomo enterprise, after the Title VII suit against them, did
not discontinue their rotation programs, but rather dealt with their discrimination
problem by promoting and hiring more non-Japanese personnel. Telephone Interview with Professor Tsurumi, supra note 31.
269. See EEOC Study, supra note 269 (reporting that as of 1989, Japanese owned
companies had a 100 percent increase in number of employees compared to approximately 50 percent (350,000/530,000) increase for other non-U.S. owned businesses,
much of increase taking place despite recession); Silver, supra note 246, at 765 n.2
(citing Johnson, Japanese-Style Management in America, CAL. MGmrr. REV. 34-35 (1988)

(stating that since 1984, Japan has made more investments in the United States than
any other nation); Bias News, supra note 3 (reporting that "Japanese companies continue to expand in the United States"); e.g., FIRM RESUME, MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC
CORPORATION OF AMERICA 16-17 (1991) (reporting company's tremendous growth,
including growth since 1982); MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL Co., LTD., 1991 AN-

NUAL REPORT 7 (1991) (reporting Matsushita's success in the United States).
270. See Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991)
(outlining elements for third-party standing); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 137071 (1991) (same); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 510 (1975) (same). If material impairment was sufficient to confer third-party standing, then all subsidiary corporations could assert the rights of their parents because any judgment against the subsidiary would materially impair the parent's investment in its subsidiary, since the
subsidiary may lose money in the judgment. The widespread application of this principle results in illogical consequences. See infra text accompanying notes 322-31.
271. A relationship based upon share ownership most likely fails to rise to a
level that the Supreme Court would consider special. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (doctor-married persons); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106
(1976) (doctor-patient); United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990)
(attorney-client). Non-special relationships have been the basis for third-party standing if the very existence of the relationship is at stake. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976).
272. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.4 (1989); see, e.g., Ed-

mondson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087 (permitting party to civil action to invoke equal protection
rights of potential jurors not to be excluded from jury panel solely on basis of race
because "the barrier to a suit by an excluded juror are daunting") (quoting Powers,
111 S. Ct. at 1373); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165 (1990) (denying "next
friend" standing due to lack of showing of inability); Warth, 422 U.S. at 510 (preclud-
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invoke the FCN Treaty rights of its non-U.S. parent in defense
of a Title VII claim, nothing prevents the parent from raising
its own rights except the company's reluctance to subject itself
to U.S. jurisdiction. For example, in Sumitomo, Sumitomo Japan did not intervene to raise its own treaty rights because it
did not want to subject itself to federal jurisdiction.2 7 3
As a matter of equity, courts considering the subsidiary's
standing to assert its parent's Article VIII(l) rights should invariably require the parent to be sufficiently unable to assert its
own rights. In Title VII suits against U.S. subsidiaries of Japa-

nese companies, plaintiffs will attempt to join parent companies as party defendants, but will generally fail because the parent is beyond the reach of U.S. courts. Particularly in cases
such as Fortino where the treaty defense is not raised until the
case is on appeal, 274 it is unfair to permit the subsidiary to ining third party standing because "there is no indication that [third parties] are disabled from asserting their own rights in a proper case"); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 446 (1972) (stating that third party would be "denied a forum in which to assert
their own rights"); NAACP v. Alabama 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958); Barrows v.Jackson,
346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953). Even in cases traditionally standing for the proposition
that third-party standing may be found on a special relationship, the third-party was
sufficiently unable to assert her own rights. E.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
117 (1976) (stating that obstacles exist to womans' ability to assert her own right to
abortions because of imminent mootness of any woman's claim and because of desire
to protect privacy).
The Supreme Court has excused the requirement that the third party be sufficiently unable to assert his or her own rights when it is apparent that the dismissal of
the case would only result in immediate reinstitution of the suit by the third party.
See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 193-94 (permitting third-party standing because "a decision by [the Court] to forgo consideration of the constitutional merits in order to
await the initiation of a new challenge to the statute by injured third parties would be
impermissibly to foster repetitive and time-consuming litigation under the guise of
caution and prudence").
273. See Lewis & Ottley, supra note 98, at 68 n.157.
274. The subsidiary's invocation of its parent's right was particularly inequitable
in Fortino because the court permitted the Quasar to raise the treaty argument for the
first time on appeal, when it was too late for plaintiffs to join Matsushita as a party
defendant. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 391. In order for plaintiffs to have joined Matsushita
as a party defendant, plaintiffs would have had to show that Matsushita exercised
control over Quasar's employment practices, or perhaps that Matsushita had dictated
Quasar's discriminatory conduct. See generally SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 102, at

1000-03. At the same time, a necessary component of Quasar's treaty argument was
that its parent had dictated its discriminatory conduct. See Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393.
Therefore, had Quasar raised the treaty argument in the district court, it may have
exposed its parent to liability in the suit. As a tactical matter, Quasar most likely
deliberately failed to raise the treaty argument to protect its parent from liability in
the suit. Evidencing the deliberate failure is the fact that Quasar had developed testi-
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voke its parent's treaty rights without a sufficient showing of
the parent's inability to assert its own rights because the parent, by failing to assert its own rights, shields itself from liability in the case. Absent the parent's inability, the subsidiary
should not be permitted to invoke its parent's Article VIII(l)
rights-if the parent joins the lawsuit, the subsidiary may be
2 75
permitted to do so.
2. Integration Does Not Support Quasar's Right to Invoke
Matsushita's Article VIII(l) Treaty Rights
The "integration" theory of parent-right invocation likewise fails to support the Fortino decision. This theory describes
certain circumstances in which courts should look beyond the
formality of separate incorporation to the substance of parentsubsidiary relationships in order to find a "common identity"
between the two otherwise separate entities.2 76 It relies on the
"integrated-enterprise" doctrine in employment discrimination law, which enables a plaintiff-employee suing a company
for employment discrimination to join the company's parent as
a party defendant upon proving that the company and its parent are sufficiently integrated in their business operations. 77
However, the integrated-enterprise doctrine is not applicable
to the Fortino situation because the plaintiffs in Fortino were not
attempting to show integration between Matsushita and
Quasar in order to hold Matsushita liable for Quasar's discriminatory conduct. On the contrary, the subsidiary was attempting to take advantage of the integration between itself and its
parent in order to relieve itself of any Title VII liability.
The purposes underlying the integrated-enterprise docmonial evidence during the trial relating to issues only pertinent to the treaty issue,
such as the issuance of "E" visas to all of Quasar's executives, without raising the
treaty argument until the appeal. See, e.g., Brief for Quasar, supra note 4, at 9. It was
unfair to permit the the subsidiary to invoke Article VIII(l) for the first time on appeal on the same basis which would have permitted the plaintiffs to join the parent
had the issue been timely raised in the district court.
275. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263-64 & n.9
(1977) (declining to reach the third party standing issue because at least one individual had demonstrated standing to assert rights as his or her own); Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 189 (1973) (same); Women's Medical Center Providence, Inc. v. Roberts,
512 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D.R.I. 1981).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104 (discussing theory).
277. See Ishizuka, Note, supra note 98, at 152-54 & nn.94 & 95; Lewis & Ottley,
supra note 98, at 61-65.
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trine further undermine the doctrine's application to Fortino.

The doctrine originated to enable employee-plaintiffs to sue
their employers by joining a sufficient number of employers to
satisfy the definition of "employer" under labor law statutes. 2 78 Employees would join their employer's parent company upon discovering that their immediate employer did not
have a sufficient number of employees to meet the jurisdictional requirement. 279 The integrated-enterprise doctrine's
purpose, therefore, is to join parent corporations for purposes
of counting employees and imposing liability on parent corporations, not to enable the subsidiary to invoke its parent's FCN
Treaty rights. 80

3. Necessity Does Not Support Quasar's Invocation of
Matsushita's Treaty Rights
The necessity theory of parent-right invocation also fails
to justify the Fortino decision. Under this theory, the U.S. subsidiary should be able to assert its parent's FCN Treaty rights if
the discriminatory conduct is crucial to the successful operation of the business. 28 ' This theory fails to support the Seventh Circuit's opinion, first, because in Fortino none of the
278. See Lewis & Ottley, supra note 98, at 62-63. Under Title VII, for example,
an "employer" is a company with fifteen or more employees for each working day of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (1988).
279. See Lewis & Ottley, supra note 98, at 63.
280. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 102, at 1000 (stating that "separate
entities are combined and treated as a single employer for purposes of counting and
liability); BLUMBERG, supra note 32, § 14.01.
Integration theory of parent-right invocation states nothing more than the general proposition that when the parent and subsidiary are sufficiently integrated to be
considered "single," rights given to one entity should be given to the other entity. At
most, the theory merely restates the principle of "piercing the corporate veil"
whereby corporate formalities between parent and subsidiary corporations are displaced and the parent is liable for the acts of its subsidiaries. See HENN & ALEXANDER,

supra note 251, at 344 (stating that concept of "piercing the corporate veil" is "converse of corporateness"). According to Professor Phillip Blumberg, "piercing the
veil jurisprudence" emerged as a safety value providing for the disregard of the corporate entity and imposition or liability upon parent corporations when separate incorporation would led to unacceptable results and "serve as a cloak for fraudulent or
other iniquitous practices." See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAw OF CORPORATE
GROUPS: STATUTORY LAW SPECIFIC xliv (1992). On the other hand, holding subsidiary corporations liable for their own acts is not an unacceptable result. On the contrary, to relieve subsidiaries for their owns acts would lead to inequitable results.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 105-13 (discussing theory).
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three plaintiffs held high-level management positions within
Quasar.282 Second, at the time the challenged conduct took
place, Quasar was not in its start up phase.2 8 3

Finally, the

plaintiffs had the requisite skill necessary to perform successfully as 84managers in the industry in which Quasar was engaged.

2

Even if we assume that Quasar could have satisfied the
three factors for necessity, necessity should not be the basis for
determining the substantive treaty rights of subsidiary corporations. By gauging the importance of the discriminatory conduct, necessity theory of parent-right invocation does nothing
more than articulate the business necessity defense. 2

5

This is

a defense to "disparate impact" Title VII claims once plaintiffs
have demonstrated a Title VII violation. 8 6 Therefore, a sub282. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306, 1308-09 (N.D. Ill.
1990), rev'd
on other grounds, 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991). Prior to their discharges from Quasar,
plaintiff John Fortino was Assistant General Manager of Quasar's Advertising, Sales
Promotions and Public Relations Department; plaintiff Carl Meyers was Quasar's
Manager of Sales Administration; and plaintiff F. William Schulz was head of the
Order Administration Department. Id.
283. See id. at 1308, 1309. Quasar was established in 1974 when Matsushita
Electric Corporation of America, the wholly-owned subsidiary of Matsushita Japan,
bought the Consumer Electronics Division of Motorola Company. Id. Therefore,
Quasar was in existence over ten years when the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred in 1986. See id. at 1309-11.
284. See id. at 1309 (stating that each plaintiff "received good performance evaluations, regular promotions and steady pay raises"). As part of his duties, plaintiff
Fortino went to Japan annually, visiting the factories and corporate headquarters in
Japan and meeting with Matsushita's Japanese advertising department. Id. at 1308.
Although Fortino did not speak Japanese, all of Quasar's Japanese management as
well as all the Matsushita personnel with whom Fortino met in Japan spoke English,
so that knowing Japanese was not necessary to the successful performance of his duties. Id. According to the court, "[flor more than a decade, the non-Japanese-speaking managerial employees of American national origin performed marketing and financial functions in conjunction with Matsushita." Id. at 1311 (footnotes omitted).
285. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k) (codifying business necessity defense); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). The business necessity defense is
established by showing that the selection policy is job-related or is compelling
enough to constitute a business necessity. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i)
(Supp. 1992).
286. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(ii) (stating that business necessity is not
required to be demonstrated until after disparate impact discrimination is found).
"Disparate impact" discrimination occurs when an employment policy that is neutral
on its face has a discriminatory impact on a protected group. See id.; Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 431-32. For discussion of Title VII issues in suits againstJapanese multinationals,
see Stacey M. Rosner, Note, Beyond the FCN Treaty: JapaneseMultinational Under Title
VII, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 871 (1983).
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sidiary will have the opportunity to argue business necessity
even if it is precluded from invoking its parent's Article VIII(l)
rights.
The U.S. Congress has set forth the appropriate situations
in which the business necessity defense may be raised against a
Title VII claim. 28 7 The invocation of another corporation's
FCN Treaty rights is not one of these situations. 28 8 Although
necessity may be a sufficient reason to insulate the subsidiary
following a prima facie showing of discrimination, it hardly
demonstrates that the subsidiary should be able to assert the
FCN Treaty rights of its parent. In sum, all three theories of
parent-right invocation rely on inapposite theories. None of
them states a meritorious basis upon which a U.S. subsidiary
may invoke its parent's FCN Treaty rights, and none of them
support the Seventh Circuit's decision in Fortino.
D. Neither the FCN Treaty Nor the Sumitomo Decision Permits the
U.S. Subsidiary to Invoke Its Parent's Article VIII(l)
Rights
Even assuming that a subsidiary were able to invoke its
parent's FCN Treaty rights under the theories of parent-right
invocation, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless should not have
permitted Quasar to invoke Matsushita's treaty rights because
rights under international treaties, including the right to invoke them, must be determined under the applicable treaties
themselves.289
287. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k). The business necessity defense may be
raised against a charge of "disparate impact" discrimination. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 43132.
288. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. 1992).
289. See Kolovrat v. Oregon 366 U.S. 187, 191-94 (1961); Asakura v. Seattle,
265 U.S. 332, 341-43 (1924); United States v. Rauscher 119 U.S. 407, 418-19 (1886);
United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11 th Cir. 1991); Hanoch Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 547-50 (D.D.C. 1981), aft'd, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Sneaker Circus, Inc., v. Carter,
457 F. Supp. 771, 795 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aft'd, 614 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979); RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 907(1) (stating that "[a] private person having rights against
the United States under an internationalagreement may assert those rights in courts in
the United States of appropriate jurisdiction either by way of claim or defense" (emphasis added)); see also Bart I. Mellits, Note, The Rights of a Foreign Corporationand Its
Subsidiary Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Treaties of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 607, 613 (1983).
For example, assume that third-party standing doctrine permits a U.S. subsidiary
to invoke the rights of its parent, but the FCN Treaty, based upon its language and
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Generally, the right to invoke international treaty obligations belongs only to the contracting government itself and not
to private parties.2 9 0 Treaties which ultimately benefit private
persons do not necessarily give them justiciable rights. 291 A
treaty may, however, give private parties the right to invoke a
treaty as a basis for a cause of action or as a defense to a civil or
criminal suit. 29 2 Whether a treaty provides persons with the

right to invoke a provision is a matter of treaty interpretation,
determined by the language and intent of the treaty.293
intent, did not. The result would be a conflict between the FCN Treaty and judicially
created doctrine. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 13 (4th ed.
1983) (stating that third-party standing, as opposed to standing under Art. III of the
U.S. Constitution, is "prudential," or judicially self-imposed). When such a conflict
exists, the FCN treaty prevails. Cf.RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 115 cmt. a (stating

that absent congressional intent otherwise, treaty prevails over statute); id.§ 111(3)
(stating that courts must give effect to international agreements).
290. United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating
that "[u]nder international law, it is the contracting foreign government, that has the
right to complain about a violation") (citing United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902
(2d Cir. 1981)); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1090 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc) (stating that "rights under international common law must belong to sovereign
nations, not to individuals, just as treaty rights are the rights of the sovereign"); RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 902 cmt. a (stating that "[o]rdinaily, claims for violation
of an international obligation may be made only by the state to whom the obligation
was owed").
291. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 111 reporter's note 4; see id. § 907 cmt. a
(stating that "[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefitting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in
domestic courts").
292. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418 (stating that "a treaty may also contain provisions
which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits") (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99
(1884)); RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 907(1) (stating that "[a] private person hav-

ing rights against the United States under an international agreement may assert
those rights in courts in the United States under an international agreement may
assert those rights in courts in the United States of appropriate jurisdiction either by
way of claim or defense").
Court of appeals decisions which have permitted criminal defendants to invoke
the extradition treaty rights of surrendering nations have also done so based upon
the intent of the treaties. See, e.g., Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418-19 (stating that "a treaty
may also contain provision which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects
of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits"); United States v. MartinVerdugo-Urguidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1354 (9th Cir. 1991) (basing holding on "[t]he
entire purpose of the Treaty, as well as treaty law in general... ");United States v.
Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1297-300 (3rd Cir. 1991) (analyzing court of appeals decisions); see also Christopher J. Morvillo, Note, Individual Rights and the Doctrine of Speciality: The Deterioration of United States v. Rauscher, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 987 (1990/

1991).
293.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 32, § 907 reporter's note 1 (1987); id. at § 907
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Neither the plain language nor the negotiating history of
the FCN Treaty indicates an intent to permit U.S. subsidiaries
to invoke the Article VIII(l) rights of their parents.2 9 4 By its
terms, the FCN Treaty permits some of its provisions to be
invoked by "nationals of [Japan]," others by "companies of
[Japan]," and still others by "companies controlled by companies of rJapan]. 2 '9 - By categorically separating the provisions
which Japanese companies may invoke from those which companies controlled by companies of Japan may invoke, the FCN
treaty intends that controlled companies (subsidiaries) can
only invoke the provisions expressly conferring rights on controlled companies. 296
The negotiating history of the FCN Treaty similarly fails
to indicate an intent to permit subsidiaries to invoke their parent's Article VIII(l) rights. 9 7 Rather, the negotiating history
of the FCN Treaty indicates an intent to treat Japanese companies and companies controlled by Japanese companies as separate and distinct entities with separately invocable substantive
rights.2 98 The negotiating history of other provisions of the
FCN Treaty demonstrates that U.S. subsidiaries were to be
considered "juridically distinct from . . . companies [of Japan]. "299
cmt. a (stating that "[wihether an international agreement provides a right or requires that a remedy be made available to a private person is a matter of interpretation of the agreement").
294. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 725 F.2d 970, 973 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting
from unpublished opinion in Spiess v. C, Itoh & Co. (America), No. 75-H-267 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 27, 1983)) (stating that the FCN Treaty would not permit the subsidiary to
invoke its parent's FCN treaty rights); Mellits, Note, supra note 289, at 613-627.
295. See FCN Treaty, supra note 5; Mellits, Note, supra note 289, at 613-14.
296. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 1981) (Reavley,
J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihe very creation of these three terms of art is a strong
indication that the drafters viewed each as representing a distinct entity"), vacated on
other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982); Porto v. Canon, U.S.A., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1679, 1682 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (stating that "[tihe fact that the framers used three
separate terms indicates that each term was to represent a distinct entity"); Mellits,
Note, supra note 289, at 613-14.
297. See Spiess, 643 F.2d at 369-72 (Reavley, J., dissenting); Mellits, Note, supra
note 289, at 618-27.
298. See Mellits, Note, supra note 289, at 618-19, 620-21; see also Spiess, 643 F.2d
at 369-72 (Reavley, J., dissenting); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 469 F. Supp. 1, 7
(S.D. Tex. 1979) (discussing history behind Article VI(3) of FCN Treaty), rev'd, 643
F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
299. E.g. Airgram No. A-22 from the U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C.,
to U.S. Embassy, Tokyo 3 (May 7, 1952), reprinted in part in Brief for Avigliano, supra
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In addition to the FCN Treaty, the Sumitomo decision does
not support the subsidiary's invocation of its parent's FCN
Treaty rights. Even though the Supreme Court failed to reach
the issue of whether the U.S. subsidiary can invoke its parent's
Article VIII(1) rights because of the procedural defects in the
manner in which the issue was raised, 30 0 based upon the

Court's analysis and interpretation of the FCN Treaty, the
Court would have precluded the subsidiary from invoking its
parent's Article VIII(l) rights had the issue been properly
raised. In Sumitomo, the Court critically considered both the
treaty language and the intent and expectations of the parties,
and drew two significant conclusions from its analysis. First,
the court stated that U.S. branches of Japanese companies
have an Article VIII(l) advantage over U.S. subsidiaries.3 0 '
The conclusion that subsidiaries cannot invoke their parents'
Article VIII(l) rights logically follows from the court's statement because if subsidiaries could invoke their parent's Article
VIII(l) rights, the U.S. branch would no longer have an Article
VIII(l) advantage over subsidiaries. 0 2 Second, the Court observed that under the FCN Treaty, U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese companies are entitled to the same rights and subject to
the same responsibilities as other U.S. companies.30 3 Taking
the Court's reasoning to its logical conclusion, if other U.S.
companies are guilty of a Title VII violation, because their hiring practices, dictated by their shareholders, cause them to
hire exclusively white executives, then U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese companies must also be guilty if their hiring practices,
dictated by their parent, cause them to hire exclusively Japanese executives. If other U.S. companies are guilty of a Title
note 260, at 14 (regarding Article VI(3) of FCN Treaty); Mellits, Note, supra note

290, at 620-21.
300. See supra note 97 (explaining that issue was improperly raised).
301. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176, 189 (1982) (stating
that "[tihe only significant advantage branches may have over subsidiaries is that
conferred by Article VIII(l)"); see In re Japanese Electronics Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 319, 324 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that "[t]he national status of the
company determines whether that company may claim the benefit conferred by Article VIII"), cert. granted on other grounds, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp, 471 U.S. 1002 (1985).
302. But see Ishizuka, Note, supra note 98, at 150-51 (inferring from Court's
statement that "a subsidiary may be able to assert the article VIII(l) rights or 'advantages' of its parent as a defense to employment practice suits").
303. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 188.
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VII violation because their salary practices, dictated by their
shareholders, cause them to pay white executives twice the
amount paid to black executives, then U.S. subsidiaries ofJapanese companies must also be guilty if their salary practices,
dictated by their parents, cause them to pay their Japanese executives twice the amount paid to non-Japanese executives.
Application of Sumitomo's interpretation of the FCN Treaty to
the issue of parent-right invocation results in the conclusion
that U.S. subsidiaries cannot invoke their parent's Article
VIII(l) rights.
As a result, Article VIII(l) permits only "companies of Japan" to invoke its provisions. Neither the FCN Treaty language nor its negotiating history suggests otherwise. As correctly held by the U.S. district court in Spiess, neither the FCN
Treaty nor the Sumitomo decision permits the subsidiary to invoke its parent's FCN Treaty rights." 4
E. The Dictum in Calnetics Does Not Support Parent-Right
Invocation of Rights Under Article VIII of the U.S. -Japan
FCN Treaty
The Ninth Circuit dictum in Calnetics30 5 does not support
the Fortino decision either. Rather, Calnetics is distinguishable
from Fortino on three grounds.
First, in Calnetics, Volkswagen's German parent did not
have rights under the treaties which Volkswagen could have
invoked. Calnetics involved Article XVI(1) of the U.S.-Germany
FCN Treaty and Articles I(1) and III of GATT, both of which
prevent the United States from discriminating against products
of Germany.30 6 Unlike Article VIII(l) of the U.S.-Japan FCN
Treaty in Fortino, the FCN treaty provisions in Calnetics did not
confer rights on companies of the treaty country. 0 7 Because the
treaty provisions in Calnetics protected products of Germany
304. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 725 F.2d 970, 973 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting
from Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), No. 75-H-267 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 1983) (unpublished opinion)).
305. 532 F.2d 674, 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); see supra text
accompanying notes 131-41 (discussing case).
306. German Treaty, supra note 135, art. XVI(1), 7 U.S.T. at 1857; GATT, supra
note 136, art. I, III, at A12, A18; Calnetics, 532 F.2d at 693.
307. In rejapanese Electronics Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 319, 324
n.3 (3d Cir. 1983) (distinguishing Article XVI from Article VIII(l) stating that Article
XVI protects products so that national status of products not company producing
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and not companies of Germany,3 0 8 German manufacturers
themselves could not have invoked the provisions of the treaties.3 0 9 If Volkswagen's German parent could not itself raise a
violation of the treaties, Volkswagen could not have invoked its
parent's treaty rights.
Second, because the treaty provisions did not confer
rights on German companies, only the German government
could properly invoke the treaty violations.3 1 0 The German
government did so by memorandum addressed to the U.S.
State Department protesting the effect the import ban would
have on U.S. treaty obligations and on its nation's manufacturers. 3 1 1 Therefore, when the court considered the effect the import ban would have on German manufacturers, the court was
products that is at issue), cert. granted on other grounds, Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 471 U.S. 1002 (1985).
308. Id.
309. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 111 reporter's note 4 (stating that "many
agreements that may ultimately benefit individual interests do not give them justiciable rights"); id. at § 907 cmt. a (stating that "[i]nternational agreements, even those
directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide
for a private cause of action in domestic courts"); see supra notes 310-13 and accompanying text (citing sources).
The court in Calnetics stated that on remand, another German manufacturer,
Porsche, should be given a chance to be heard. Calnetics, 532 F.2d at 694. The court,
however, never stated that that German company, or any other German company,
had any right to invoke treaty violations. Id. at 693-94. Rather, the court believed
that elementary fairness requires notice to Porsche by virtue of its "importation
agreement" with Volkswagen, not by virtue of having treaty rights. Id. at 694. The
agreement was the basis for the notice, not the company's treaty rights. If the court
believed that all German manufacturers had rights under the treaties, it could have
ordered notice to all German manufacturers.
310. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 902 cmt. a (stating that "[o]rdinarily, claims

for violation of an international obligation may be made only by the state to whom
the obligation was owed"); id. § 902(2) (stating that government has right to protest
for injuries resulting to its nationals or to other persons on whose behalf it is entitled
to make a claim under international law).
311. Calnetics v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219, 1225-26
(C.D. Cal. 1973) (reprinting memorandum), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 532 F.2d
674, 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). There exists authority for the
proposition that private parties may complain about a treaty violation upon a protest
by the contracting state. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1533
(S.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that "[als a general principle of international law, individuals
have no standing to challenge violations of international treaties in the absence of a
protest by the sovereign involved"); see also Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906
(2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973) (permitting criminal defendants to invoke extradition rights of surrendering nations upon formal protest by the surrendering nation).
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not permitting the subsidiary to invoke its parent's rights, but

merely considering the German government's protest against
the court's imposition of an import ban because of the effect it
would have on its nation's companies. In Fortino, neither of the
two entities permitted to invoke Article VIII(l) raised any potential violation of the FCN Treaty. 1 2 The Japanese government did not protest by correspondence with the State Department, and Matsushita did not intervene in the suit.
Third, Calnetics involved the importation of goods,
whereas Fortino involved the enforcement of Title VII. The
language of both treaties involved in Calnetics (GATT and the
U.S-Germany FCN Treaty) expressed a clear intent to regulate
U.S. imposition of import bans.31 3 In other words, the parties
to the agreement intended to prohibit U.S. courts from imposing certain import restrictions, such as the one in issue in
Calnetics.3 t4 This intent is manifested by subsequent acts of the
German government, 1 5 i.e. the protest concerning the court's
312. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991); Fortino v. Quasar
Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd, 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
313. See German Treaty, supra note 135, art. XIV(2), 7 U.S.T. at 1855; GATT,
supra note 136, art. I, 61 Stat. 5, at A12. Article I(l) of GATT provides in relevant
part that
[w]ith respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation...
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
Id.
Although not in issue in Calnetics, Article XIV(2) of the U.S.-German FCN Treaty
provides in relevant part that "[n]either party shall impose restrictions or prohibitions on the importation of any product of the other Party... unless the importation
of the like product of ... all third countries is similarly restricted or prohibited."
German Treaty, supra note 135, art. XIV(2), 7 U.S.T. at 1855.
314. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 111(3) (stating that U.S. courts are

bound to give effect to international agreements); see also Maximov v. United States,
373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963) (holding that the language of treaties control unless inconsistent with intent of signatories).
315. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co. 351 F. Supp. 702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(stating that "a prime canon of treaty construction is to look to the subsequent actions of the parties for the interpretation of the treaty in areas clearly unanticipated at
the time"), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Pigeon River Improvement
Slide and Bloom Co. v. Cox, 291 U.S. 138, 160-61 (1934); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that "[t]he conduct of the parties
subsequent to ratification of a treaty may, thus, be relevant in ascertaining the proposed construction to accord the treaty's various provisions"), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
890 (1976).
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anticipated injunction. On the other hand, the U.S.-Japan
FCN Treaty involved in Fortino does not prohibit the enactment or enforcement of anti-discrimination laws such as Title
VII.3 1 6 To the contrary, the parties to that treaty intended to

prohibit discriminatory practices.31 7 The lack of intent to preclude U.S. enactment and enforcement of Title VII may be
evinced by the Japanese government's silence when the U.S.
Congress passed Title VI3 18 and its acquiescence during U.S.

enforcement of Title VII against Japanese owned subsidiaries.31 9 In fact, in the Sumitomo case resolving claims against the
U.S. subsidiaries of two of Japan's largest companies, Japan
not only acquiesced in the enforcement of Title VII, but the
Japanese government concurred in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the treaty prohibiting the subsidiary from invoking
Article VIII(I)." 2 ° Accordingly, in Fortino, the Japanese government neither protested enforcement of Title VII nor interpreted the FCN treaty to permit subsidiary invocation of its
parent's treaty rights.
Instead of permitting the subsidiary to invoke its parent's
treaty rights, the court in Calnetics was considering a protest by
the German government regarding the effects of the import
ban on its nation's companies, the subject matter of the ban
clearly being regulated under the treaties. Calnetics is clearly
distinguishable from Fortino and thus does not support the Fortino decision. Calnetics is inapplicable when a U.S. subsidiary
316. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d Cir. 1981)
(stating that "[slubjecting a Japanese company to Title VII is consistent with the language and purpose of Article VIII of the Treaty . . . "), vacated on other grounds, 457
U.S. 176 (1982); Brief for Avigliano, supra note 260, at 21-34 (arguing that, based
upon State Department documents and Senate hearings, the FCN Treaty never intended to prevent enactment or enforcement of Title VII).
317. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176, 188 (1982) (stating
that "[t]he purpose of the Treaty provisions was to assure that corporations of one
Treaty party have the right to conduct business within the territory of the other party
without suffering discrimination as an alien entity"); Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji
Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176
(1982) (stating that Article VIII(l) "was primarily intended to exempt companies operating abroad from local legislation restricting the employment of noncitizens");
Brief for Avigliano, supra note 259, at 21-34.
318. See 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355-2519; DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INr'L LAW

(1964).
319. See supra note 3 (listing cases against Japanese owned subsidiaries).
320. See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 183-84.
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seeks to invoke rights under Article VIII(l).

D. The Implications of Fortino: The Illogical Consequences of
Parent-Right Invocation
The court in Fortino, instead of merely allowing the U.S.
subsidiary to assert its parent's rights in the limited context
before the court, created a broad principle whereby a parent's
exercise of control over allegedly illegal conduct of the subsidiary would allow the subsidiary to invoke its parent's rights.3 2 2
The illogical consequences of applying the principle to other
provisions of the FCN Treaty and other areas of U.S. law
demonstrate that U.S. courts should not allow the principle of
parent-right invocation to survive.
Under Article XI(4) of the FCN Treaty, the United States
is obligated to tax "companies ofJapan" doing business in the
United States only on U.S. source income and not on their
world-wide income. 23 U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese companies, on the other hand, cannot invoke Article XI(4) and become subject to taxation as Japanese companies because,
under the Sumitomo decision, U.S. subsidiaries are U.S. companies.3 24 As U.S. companies, the subsidiaries are taxed on their
world-wide income. 32 5 However, if the subsidiary is able to invoke the Treaty rights of its parent on the ground that the par321. See Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 469 F. Supp. 1, 8 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (stating that "analysis of Calnetics reveals that it does not stand for the proposition that a
United States-incorporated subsidiary of a foreign corporation has, in addition to all
Treaty rights specifically granted it, those Treaty rights granted its foreign parent"),
rev'd on other grounds, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S.
1128 (1982)); see also In re Japanese Electronics Products Antitrust Litigation, 723
F.2d 319, 324 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983) (distinguishing Article VIII(l) and application of
Sumitomo from circumstances when considering FCN Treaty provision relating to
"products" of a treaty country), cert. granted on other grounds, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 471 U.S. 1002 (1985).
322. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991) (permitting
parent-right invocation because the parent had "dictated the subsidiary's discriminatory conduct").
323. FCN Treaty, supra note 5, art. XI(4), 4 U.S.T. at 2072; Walker, supra note
216, at 238.
324. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
325. See I.R.C. §§ 61, 11, 7701 (1988) (imposing tax on corporations created or
organized in the United States on income from whatever source derived); BoRIs I
BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION § 65.3
(1991) (stating that "[d]omestic corporations .

comes").

.

. are taxed on their worldwide in-
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ent had dictated its business operations, the U.S. subsidiary
would no longer be taxed as a U.S. company, but would instead be taxed as a Japanese company on the basis of U.S.
source income alone. Simply put, the subsidiary could accomplish indirectly what it could not accomplish directly.
The FCN Treaty contains twenty-six provisions defining
rights pertaining to "companies of [Japan]. ' 326 U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese companies cannot directly invoke any of these
provisions because, according to Sumitomo, the subsidiaries are
U.S. companies. 21 However, if a U.S. subsidiary is able to invoke the FCN Treaty rights of its Japanese parent, the subsidiary could circumvent the Sumitomo decision and invoke all
twenty-six provisions of the FCN Treaty.
Application of the parent-right invocation principle produces similar consequences when applied to other areas of
U.S. law. For example, subsidiary corporations entering into
contracts with third parties are normally liable on those contracts. 328 At the same time, the subsidiaries' parents are generally not liable on the contracts. 329 Applying the principle of
parent-right invocation, if subsidiaries sued for breach of contract were able to invoke their parents' rights on the ground
that the parents had dictated the breach of contract, neither
the subsidiaries nor their parents would be liable on the contracts.
Similarly, subsidiaries which negligently cause harm to
third parties are liable in tort to those third parties.33 ° On the
other hand, parent companies are generally not liable for the
326. See FCN Treaty, supra note 5, art. IV(I), (2) art. V(I), art. VI(l), (2), (3), (4),
art. VII(I),(4), art. VIII(l), (3), art. IX(l), (2), (3), (4), art. X, art. XI(l), (3), (4), art.
XII(I), art. XIII, art. XIV(2), (5), art. XV(3), art. XVI(2), art. XVII(2), art. XXII(3), at
2067-76, 2080. Many of those provisions define rights already enjoyed by other U.S.
companies. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176, 189 (1982).
327. See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. 176.
328. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 250, § 146 (stating that -[b]y the general rule, contractual obligations of a corporation subject it . . to liability thereon").
329. E.g., Whitehurst v. FCX Fruityard Vegetable Service, 32 S.E.2d 34 (N.C.
1944); see HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 250, § 146 (stating that "[b]y the general
rule, contractual obligations of a corporation [do not subject] its shareholders ... to
liability thereon").
330. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 250, § 79 (stating characteristics of corporations including ability to be sued in corporate name as any other natural persons
may be sued).
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tortious acts of their subsidiaries. 3 3' Applying the principle of
parent-right invocation, if subsidiaries were able to assert their
parents' rights on the grounds that the parent had dictated the
negligent conduct, neither the subsidiaries nor their parents
would be liable for the tortious conduct.
The illogical consequences of parent-right invocation are
apparent. In essence, whenever a subsidiary's rights are different from the parent's rights, the subsidiary's rights would suddenly be the same as the parent's rights as long as the parent
had dictated the challenged conduct. The principle of parentright invocation permits companies to disregard the fact that
the two corporations are separate entities with separate substantive rights. It therefore allows corporations to violate basic
principles of corporate law.
CONCLUSION
The Fortino decision should not be followed by other U.S.
courts because it ignores Supreme Court precedent and relies
on numerous erroneous assumptions and conclusions. Courts
should maintain the status quo as it stands under the Sumitomo
decision according to which subsidiaries of Japanese companies do not have the advantage of Article VIII(l), especially
considering the slight impact the Sumitomo decision has had on
Japanese companies' assignment practices and their management systems. U.S. subsidiaries ofJapanese companies should
be forced to conform to U.S. laws. Courts should not allow the
subsidiaries to hire in a discriminatory manner nor allow them
to pay their parents' employment bills by compensating rotating executives with U.S. revenues when such conduct discriminates against U.S. workers. Courts considering Title VII
claims against U.S. subsidiaries should fully appreciate the
Supreme Court's reinforcement of principles of entity law as
well as its clear message precluding Japanese companies from
ignoring the form of their U.S. investment. The principle of
parent-right invocation undermines Sumitomo's efforts, relies
331. E.g., Bujosa v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 355 N.Y.S.2d 800 (App.
Div. 1974); see HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 250, § 146 (stating that
"[s]hareholders as such are generally not liable to persons injured by torts committed by a corporate agent").

1991-1992]

PARENT-RIGHT INVOCATION

1195

upon inapposite theories and violates principles of corporate
law.
Jerry Choe*
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